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This Article presents the findings of a content analysis of 86 family law casebooks 
published in the United States from 1960 to 2019. Its purpose is to critically assess 
the discipline of family law with the aim of informing our understandings of family 
law’s history and exposing its ideological foundations and consequences. Although 
legal thinkers have written several intellectual histories of family law, this is the first 
quantitative look at the field. 
The study finds that coverage of marriage and divorce in family law casebooks has 
decreased by almost half relative to other topics since the 1960s. In contrast, pages 
dedicated to child custody and child support have increased, more than doubling 
their relative share. At the same time, the boundaries of family law appear to remain 
quite stubborn. Notwithstanding sustained efforts by family law scholars and 
educators to restructure the field of family law so that it considers additional 
domains of law affecting families (such as tax, business, employment, health, 
immigration, and government benefits), the core of the academic field of family law 
has remained relatively static in the past 60 years. Marriage, divorce, child custody, 
and child support continue to dominate the topics presented in family law casebooks, 
representing 55% to 75% of their content since the 1960s. 
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This study may prove useful to law school educators and reformers concerned with 
ensuring that law schools prepare students for contemporary family law practice, 
as well as scholars concerned with the ways that legal education reproduces a 
particular set of ideologies of the family and society. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the beginning the Law created the 
patriarch; he was master, husband, and 
father. The treatise writers saw the legal 
order and said it was good.1 The Law divided 
the master from the servant, the husband 
from the wife, and the father from the child. 
It was called “the law of persons”―the first 
day. 
And the Law said, “Let servants and 
slaves be free2 and let there be contracts that 
define free men and divide men from women 
and children.” So the Law made contracts, 
defining free men and dividing men from 
1. See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
(1765); TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME, OF PARENT AND CHILD, OF
GUARDIAN AND WARD, MASTER AND SERVANT, AND OF THE POWERS OF COURTS OF CHANCERY 
(New Haven, Oliver Steele 1816). 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (1865); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (1868).
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women and children. And it was so. The 
treatise writers called it “the law of 
contracts.”3 And there was the market and 
the family, the public and the private―the 
second day. 
And the treatise writers said, “Let the 
law of contracts be collected together in one 
place so that the law of husbands, wives, and 
children may be seen.”4 And it was so. They 
called the law of husbands, wives, and 
children “domestic relations.”5 And when the 
treatise writers saw how good it was, they 
said, “The contract of marriage is the most 
important of all human transactions. It is the 
very basis of the whole fabric of civilized 
society.”6 And the Law declared marriage as 
the most important of all social 
relations7―the third day. 
And the Law said, “Let there be 
equality across the expanse of the field of 
domestic relations, to separate wives from 
husbands and increase wives’ equality,8 and 
let sex- and (eventually) sexuality-based 
3. 1 THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1853).
4. Id.
5. JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS
(1870). 
6. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND
DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD
TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS § 109, at 101 (1834); see 
also 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 8, 
at 6 (5th ed. 1873) (“Marriage . . . establishes fundamental and most important domestic 
relations.”). 
7. See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210–11 (1888) (“[Marriage] is the
foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor 
progress.”); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878) (“Upon [marriage] society 
may be said to be built . . . .”). 
8. See Richard H. Chused, Married Women’s Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO.
L.J. 1359, 1397–1412 (1983) (linking coverture’s reforms to economic and equality
considerations).
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rules in marriage be eliminated.”9 And it was 
so. Thus, the Law created two great spouses; 
although, in practice, a greater spouse 
governed the workplace, and a lesser spouse 
governed the home and the children.10 The 
treatise writers, who now pronounced the 
law in casebooks, called it “family law” and 
said it was good11―the fourth day. 
And the Law said, “Let children fly 
through society as free creatures. Let the law 
sever carnal relationships from kinship ties 
that lash parent to child and parents to one 
another.” The treatise writers called it “child 
law” and said it was good.12 The Law then 
blessed the children, saying, “Family law 
shall exist mainly for your benefit and 
protection”13―the fifth day. 
And then some treatise writers 
imagined a future when the Law would say: 
“Let family law expand so that it is 
everywhere. Let family law have dominion 
over every area of law that touches on sex, 
 
 9. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 271 (1979) (holding that a sex-based 
spousal support law violates equal protection); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 
(2015) (holding that sex- and sexuality-based marriage entrance and interstate recognition 
laws violate constitutional guarantees of equality and dignity); Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 
2075, 2078 (2017) (per curiam) (holding that a sex- and sexuality-based presumptive 
parenthood law violates constitutional guarantees of equality and dignity); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480, 486 (1965) (holding that married couples have a 
constitutional right of privacy to use contraceptives). 
 10. See CYNTHIA LEE STARNES, THE MARRIAGE BUYOUT: THE TROUBLED 
TRAJECTORY OF U.S. ALIMONY LAW 9 (2014). 
 11. E.g., JUDITH AREEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW (1978); HARRY 
KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1976); MORRIS PLOSCOWE, HENRY H. 
FOSTER, JR. & DORIS JONAS FREED, FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1972). 
 12. See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: 
DOCTRINE, POLICY, AND PRACTICE (2000); ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, 
CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW (1989); 
WALTER WADLINGTON, CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & SAMUEL M. DAVIS, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1983). 
 13. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL 
FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 84, 230–33 (1995); MERLE H. WEINER, 
A PARENT-PARTNER STATUS FOR AMERICAN FAMILY LAW passim (2015). 
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reproduction, and care. Let it have dominion 
over constitutional law and contract law, 
property law and criminal law, over torts and 
tax law, employment law and immigration 
law, over government welfare law, over every 
area of law that touches on sex, 
reproduction, care, and the economics of the 
family, over all the law.” This body of law will 
create a new field called “the law of intimate 
relations.” It will not be centered on 
marriage; it will erase the market/family and 
public/private distinctions; and it will 
include a multitude of human connections 
involving sex, reproduction, and care.14 And 
the treatise writers saw this emerging new 
field, the “law of intimate relations.” And, 
behold, it was very good!―the sixth day. 
A. Background: Family Law’s History and Future 
What is the history of family law? What are its defining principles and 
purposes, past and present? What relationships constitute the field’s core? What is 
family law’s future? These questions have occupied treatise writers, teachers, and 
leaders of the bar since the field of domestic relations emerged as a distinct branch 
of legal knowledge in the 19th century. Many legal thinkers have traced the field’s 
history and predicted its future. Out of these histories, a consensus has emerged that 
contemporary family law resulted from a series of transformations, however 
overlapping, contested, and incomplete. 
In the first transformation, the law of master and servant was transformed 
into the law of productive labor (“from status to contract”)15 and thereby separated 
from the law of the household. This development roughly coincided with the end of 
chattel slavery in the United States and the rise of the classical era of contract law, 
which imagined individuals as autonomous, rational agents operating in the public 
sphere of free markets.16 The husband/wife and parent/child relationships were 
skipped over in this emancipatory transformation, remaining firmly within the law 
 
 14. See, e.g., NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: 
VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW passim (2009); Laura T. Kessler, New Frontiers in 
Family Law, in TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND 
LEGAL THEORY 226, 226–42 (Martha Albertson Fineman ed., 2011) [hereinafter Kessler, New 
Frontiers]. 
 15. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY 
HISTORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 168–69 (1861). 
 16. See FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOME ECONOMICUS xiii–xiv (Martha Albertson 
Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds., 2005); see also Emily Hough, Sketches of a Redemptive 
Theory of Contract Law, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 951, 956 (2015). 
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of the household and the domain of status-based, hierarchical relationships.17 
Through this separation, the legal definition of the husband/wife and parent/child 
relationships crystallized into the opposite of contract—as relationships whose 
essential ideas are affection, care, duty, and dependency, rather than consent and the 
equal right that exists between person and person.18 
In the second and third phases, which unfolded over roughly 100 years, 
feminist reformers remade family law. Specifically, in a second transformation, 
feminists challenged the separation of the family from the market, seeking to bring 
contract principles into the family, primarily through the joint marital property 
demands of the women’s rights movement in the second half of the 19th century.19 
Yet this movement did not succeed in fully emancipating women from the common 
law of marital status.20 And so, in a third transformation, almost a century later, 
feminist reformers worked to systematically revise the law of marriage to embrace 
gender equality as its defining principle and to exorcise patriarchy as the ordering 
structure of the field. In this phase, which we can delineate as the birth of modern 
family law,21 judges and legislatures instantiated formal equality as a guiding 
17. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 22–23 (1984); AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO
CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION
16 (1998); Janet Halley, What is Family Law: A Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 
(2011) [hereinafter Halley I]; DUNCAN KENNEDY, The Transformation of Contract, in THE 
RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT (1975); Maria Rosaria Marella, Critical 
Family Law, 19 J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 721 (2011). 
18. See Laura T. Kessler, Reynolds v. United States, Rewritten, in FEMINIST
JUDGMENTS: FAMILY LAW OPINIONS REWRITTEN 24, 31 (Rachel Rebouché ed., 2020) 
(discussing the idea of marriage-as-status in Joseph Story and Francis Lieber’s 19th century 
treatises on the family). 
19. See Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims
Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850–1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076–78 (1994). 
20. See id.; see also Andrew J. King, Constructing Gender: Sexual Slander in
Nineteenth-Century America, 13 L. & HIST. REV. 63, 63–64 (1995) (“Married women’s 
property acts . . . were often subject to hostile judicial scrutiny. Divorce legislation received 
an equally chilly reception. This cautious reaction to women’s rights stands in contrast to 
judicial eagerness to recast rules that dealt with economic relations. . . . Domestic-relations 
law developed according to its own special purpose—protection of the republican family and 
male governance . . . .”). 
21. For efficiency’s sake, I have skipped in this recounting a phase in the field’s
development in the 1920s and 1930s, when a group of curricular reformers, primarily at 
Columbia Law School, sought to expand the field by drawing together diverse laws touching 
on family relationships. These efforts, which were part of a larger reform agenda aimed at 
broadening legal studies to include the social sciences, sought to connect the law of the family 
with the law of the market, criminal law, and the administrative state. See Brainerd Currie, 
The Materials of Law Study, 8 J.L. EDUC. 1, 22, 28–38 (1955); Janet Halley, What is Family 
Law: A Genealogy Part II, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 189, 192, 220–27 (2011) [hereinafter 
Halley II]. It was in this period one first sees efforts to change the field’s nomenclature from 
“domestic relations” to “family law.” Halley II, supra, at 192. But the Columbia reformers’ 
efforts to remake the field as “family law” were not realized, see id. at 192. Perhaps reflecting 
this failure, the new nomenclature did not seep into family law casebook titles until the early 
1960s. A review of the titles of family law casebooks published in the 1950s and 1960s reveals 
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principle in the field and transformed marriage into a legal relationship that is largely 
terminable at will.22 With these reforms, family law thus became principally focused 
on the economics of marriage termination and the obligations of parents to children 
upon marital dissolution. Since the 1970s, feminists have continued their critique of 
marriage to further disrupt the ideological building blocks of traditional marriage, 
including ideologies holding that marriage is not meant for women’s sexual 
pleasure,23 that family law is a matter of exclusively local jurisdiction,24 that the 
family must remain free of commodification and economic exchange25 and separate 
from the market,26 and that human dependencies should be addressed primarily by 
the family rather than the state.27 
 
the shift in nomenclature. See WILLIAM RANDALL COMPTON, CASES ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 
(1951); ALBERT C. JACOBS & JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON DOMESTIC 
RELATIONS (1952); GEORGE LUTHER CLARK, CASES ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1954); ALBERT 
C. JACOBS & JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 
(1961); FOWLER V. HARPER & JEROME H. SKOLNICK, PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY (1962); 
MORRIS PLOSCOWE & DORIS JONAS FREED, FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1963); 
HOMER H. CLARK, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1965); CALEB 
FOOTE, ROBERT J. LEVY & FRANK E. A. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 
(1966). 
  As the Columbia chapter of this history demonstrates, pinpointing the 
beginning of “family law” is not unproblematic. As Müller-Freienfels, a German scholar of 
civil law concerned with the international unification of law, including family law,  observes, 
“[R]ecognizing the droit de famille or the Familienrecht as a special legal branch or coherent 
unit with the aim of ordering the entirety of its norms in a system is a very complex matter.” 
Wolfram Müller-Freienfels, The Emergence of Droit de Famille and Familienrecht in 
Continental Europe and the Introduction of Family Law in England, 28 J. FAM. HIST. 31, 31 
(2003). Legal thinkers did not describe family law as such until the mid-20th century when 
casebook authors started using the designation “family law” in casebook titles. However, 
legal thinkers employed the term at an earlier date, even if they did not use it as a formal 
classification. 
 22. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 
(1989); Susan Frelich Appleton, How Feminism Remade American Family Law (and How It 
Did Not), in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 426 (Cynthia Grant Bowman 
& Robin West eds., 2019); Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 
475, 478–79 (1999); Halley II, supra note 21, at 217; Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse 
and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803,1809–10 (1985). 
 23. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Toward a “Culturally Cliterate” Family Law?, 
23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 267, 268–69 (2008). 
 24. See JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 17–66 (2014); Arianne 
Renan Barzilay, Labor Regulation as Family Regulation: Decent Work and Decent Families, 
33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 119, 124 (2012); Courtney G. Joslin, The Perils of Family 
Law Localism, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 623, 623 (2014). 
 25. See MARTHA ERTMAN, LOVE’S PROMISES xi–xxv (2015); RETHINKING 
COMMODIFICATION 303–47 (Martha Ertman & Joan Williams eds., 2005); Martha M. Ertman, 
Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women’s Work Through Premarital 
Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17, 19–20 (1998); Joan C. Williams, Is Coverture 
Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2249–54 (1994). 
 26. See Halley I, supra note 17; Halley II, supra note 21. 
 27. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF 
DEPENDENCY 208–09, 237–39 (2004). 
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In a fourth transformation, still underway, children gained rights and came 
to be seen as autonomous individuals, separate and distinct from their parents in the 
legal sense of family. In this phase, the parent/child relationship became a central 
focus of family law;28 the courts removed almost all of the disabilities of birth 
outside marriage,29 and the field began to think in terms of the autonomy of, rather 
than rights to, children.30 Although incomplete and contested,31 this transformation 
in the law’s conception of children and their legal status was a significant shift. More 
recently, with the rise of nonmarital cohabitation and reproductive technologies 
enabling individuals to sever reproduction from sexual relations, the field has shifted 
its focus even more deeply to questions concerning the definition of a legal parent 
and the parent/child relationship.32 
What is family law’s next transformation? Legal and demographic 
developments are disrupting the field once again. Since 2001, beginning with the 
Netherlands, 31 countries have legalized marriage for same-sex couples,33 and 
 
 28. See JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION 
IN FAMILY LAW xiii–xiv, 180–94 (2000) (showing how parent-child relationships were made 
an important and distinct category of family law in a gradual process of legal recognition that 
matured during the 1980s). 
 29. See, e.g., Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75–76 (1968) 
(invalidating, under the Equal Protection Clause, a Louisiana statute denying parents recovery 
for the wrongful death of children born outside marriage); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 
70–72 (1968) (invalidating, under the Equal Protection Clause, a Louisiana statute that 
excluded nonmarital children from recovering for the wrongful death of their mother but 
allowed children born to married women to recover). 
 30. See Victoria Mikesell Mather, Evolution and Revolution in Family Law, 25 
ST. MARY’S L.J. 405, 430 (1993). 
 31. See HASDAY, supra note 24, at 133–58 (contesting the story in family law that 
common law property norms no longer shape the law of parenthood); BARBARA BENNETT 
WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT (2008) (telling the story of children’s rights in America, 
and asking why the United States today, alone among nations, rejects the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child). 
 32. See sources cited supra note 13; UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 
2017). 
 33. In order of legalization, the countries that permit marriage without regard to 
the sex of the parties are: Wet van 21 december 2000, Stb. 2001, 9 (Neth.); Loi du 13 février 
2003 ouvrant le mariage à des personnes de même sexe [Law Opening Marriage to Persons 
of the Same Sex], M.B., Feb. 28, 2003 (Belg.); Ley por la que se modifica el Código Civil en 
materia de derecho a contraer matrimonio (B.O.E. 2005, 157) (Spain); The Civil Marriage 
Act, S.C. 2005, c 33 (Can.); Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 (S. Afr.); Lov om ekteskap [The 
Marriage Act], Act 1991-07-04 No. 47, amended by Act 2008-27-06 No. 53 (Nor.); LAG OM 
UPPHÄVANDE AV LAGEN OM REGISTRERAT PARTNERSKAP (Svensk författnings-
samlingförfattningssamling [SFS] 2009:260) (Swed.); Law No. 26.618, July 22, 2010, 
[CXVIII] B.O. 31.949 (Arg.); Lög um breytingar á hjúskaparlögum og fleiri lögum og um 
brottfall laga um staðfesta samvist (ein hjúskaparlög) [Law on Amendments to the Marriage 
Act and the Repeal of Registered Partnerships (One Marriage Act)], Law No. 65/2010 (Ice.); 
Lei n. ° 9/2010 de 31 de Maio Permite o casamento civil entre pessoas do mesmo sexo [Act 
no. 9/2010 of May 31] (Port.); Lov nr. 532 af 12/06/2012 [Law no. 532 of 06/12/2012] (Den.); 
Resolução no. 175, de 14 de Maio de 2013, C.N.J., n. º 89/2013, D.J.e., 15/05/2013, 2 (Braz.); 
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, c. 30 (Eng.); Loi 2013-404 du 17 mai 2013 ouvrant 
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several others are close to joining these nations34 or will (at least) recognize valid 
marriages performed abroad.35 At the same time, marriage is becoming less 
common, with significant portions of the populations of the United States and other 
 
le mariage aux couples de personnes de même sexe [Law 2013-404 of May 17, 2013 Opening 
Marriage to Same-Sex Couples], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], May 17, 2013, p. 8253 (Fr.); Marriage (Definition of 
Marriage) Amendment Act 2013 (N.Z.); Matrimonio Igualitario [Equal Marriage] (Law No. 
19.075) (Uru.); Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 c. 30 (Wales); Loi du 4 juillet 2014 
portant de réforme du mariage [Law of July 4, 2014 on the Reform of Marriage], JOURNAL 
OFFICIEL DU GRAND-DUCHÉ DE LUXEMBOURG [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF LUXEMBOURG], 
July 17, 2014, p. 1798 (Lux.); Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014, (ASP 5) 
(Scot.); Marriage Act 2015 (Act No. 23/2015), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie
/eli/2015/act/35/enacted/en/print.html (Ir.); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) 
(U.S.); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], abril 28, 2016, Sentencia C-214/16 
(Colom.); Lov om ændring af myndighedsloven for Grønland, lov om ikrafttræden for 
Grønland af lov om ægteskabets retsvirkninger, retsplejelov for Grønland og kriminallov for 
Grønland [Act Amending the Authority Act for Greenland, Act on the Entry into Force of 
Greenland by the Act on the Legal Effects of Marriage, the Code of Judicial Procedure for 
Greenland and Criminal Law for Greenland], LOVTIDENDE A [OFFICIAL GAZETTE A], Feb. 3, 
2016, no. 103 (Green.); Marriage Amendment (Definition and Religious Freedoms) Act 2017 
(Cth) (Austl.); Lag om ändring av äktenskapslagen [Act Amending the Marriage Act] (Law 
No. 156/2015) (Fin.); Gesetz zur Einführung des Rechts auf Eheschlieüng für Personen 
gleichen Geschlechts [Law Allowing the Right of Persons of the Same Sex to Marry], June 
30, 2017, BGBL. I at 2787 (Ger.); Act No. XXIII of 2017 Marriage Act and Other Laws 
(Amendment) of 2017, THE MALTA GOVERNMENT GAZETTE 19,840, Aug. 1, 2017, Gov’t 
Notice No. 831 (Malta); Verfassungsgerichtshof [VfGH] [Constitutional Court], Dec. 4, 
2017, No. G 258-259/2017-9 (Austria); Ecuador’s Top Court Approves Same-Sex Marriage, 
BBC NEWS (June 13, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-48620744 
(Ecuador); Enforcement Act of Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748, May 17, 2019 (Taiwan);  
Costa Rica Constitutional Court, Res. No. 12782-2018, https://nexuspj.poder-
judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0007-875801 (ordering lawmakers to extend marriage rights 
to same-sex couples in Costa Rica within 18 months); Costa Rica Supreme Court, Sec. Gen., 
Circular No. 113-2018, Nov. 26, 2018, https://www.imprentanacional.go.cr/pub-
boletin/2018/11//bol_26_11_2018.pdf (extending 18-month deadline to May 26, 2020) 
(Costa Rica); Executive Formation Etc. Act (Northern Ireland) 2019 c. 22 (N. Ir.). 
 34. A landmark advisory opinion by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
declaring that, inter alia, states must extend all existing legal mechanisms—including 
marriage—to same-sex couples is expected to facilitate marriage equality in several countries 
in the Americas. See State Obligations Concerning Change of Name, Gender Identity, and 
Rights Derived from a Relationship Between Same-Sex Couples (Interpretation and Scope of 
Articles 1(1), 3, 7, 11(2), 13, 17, 18 and 24, in relation to Article 1, of the American 
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 
24 (Nov. 24, 2017), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_24_esp.pdf. 
 35. In Israel, for example, same-sex marriages performed abroad in a jurisdiction 
where such marriages are legal can be registered with the state for some purposes. See HCJ 
3045/05 Ben-Ari v. Director of Population Registry in Interior Ministry, 61(3) PD 537 (2006) 
(Isr.); Aeyal Gross, Israel’s Supreme Court Orders Registration of Same-Sex Marriage 
Conducted in Canada, LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES, 226 (Dec. 2006). 
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countries cohabiting outside of marriage.36 That is, marriage is simultaneously 
becoming more inclusive yet less central as an organizing social institution. 
The shifts in the legal definition and social significance of marriage have 
generated considerable debate and discussion among leading thinkers in the field. A 
significant contingent on the critical left (and here I mean left of “liberal”) has called 
for a new era of family law and policy that does not make marriage the dividing line 
between who is and who is not a family deserving legal recognition, status, and 
benefits.37 According to these experts, demoting marriage to private religious or 
cultural practice is the preferred course. Most of the energy for this line of attack has 
come from the queer and critical-left flank of family law,38 but not only.39 
More conservative and traditional voices have responded that 
disestablishing marriage risks disturbing valuable ideologies and purposes served 
by marriage, such as faithfulness, financial interdependence, and the optimal care of 
children. Relying on legal analysis and social science, these experts contend that 
marriage constitutes a more stable relationship than unmarried cohabitation. 
 
 36. For example, in the United States, the 2010 Census showed that less than 25% 
of U.S. households consisted of traditional nuclear families (married parents with children), 
while the number of households headed by unmarried partners had increased by 41% from 
2000 to 2010. See DAPHNE LOFQUIST ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLDS AND 
FAMILIES: 2010, at 3, 10 tbl.4 (2012). Unmarried partner households made up at least 5.2% 
of total households and included some 7.7 million people, 4.6 million in opposite-sex 
households. Id. at 3, 5 tbl.2. 
 37. See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 13, at 228–30; KATHERINE FRANKE, 
WEDLOCKED: THE PERILS OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY passim (2015); POLIKOFF, supra note 14, 
passim; RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 217–28 (2009) (arguing that only private institutions, not 
the state, should recognize something called “marriage”); Lisa Duggan, Beyond Same-Sex 
Marriage: A New Strategic Vision for All Our Families and Relationships, 9 STUD. GENDER 
& SEXUALITY 161, 161–68 (2008); Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the 
Family, 119 YALE L.J. 1236, 1269–79 (2010). 
 38. See, e.g., FRANKE, supra note 37; POLIKOFF, supra note 14; Drucilla Cornell, 
The Public Supports of Love, in JUST MARRIAGE 81, 82 (Mary Lyndon Shaney ed., 2004); 
Michael Warner, Beyond Gay Marriage, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 259, 260 (Wendy 
Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002); Paula L. Ettelbrick, Domestic Partnership, Civil Unions, 
or Marriage: One Size Does Not Fit All, 64 ALB. L. REV. 905, 914 (2001); Ruthann Robson 
& S.E. Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Intimate Partners and Lesbian Legal Theory, 63 
TEMPLE L.J. 511, 540 (1990); Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to 
Liberation?, OUT/LOOK: NAT. LESBIAN & GAY Q., Autumn 1989, at 8–12. 
 39. See FINEMAN, supra note 13, at 230–33 (arguing that the publicly supported 
form of the family should be the mother/child dyad and thus challenging the confluence of 
the family and sexual relationships imposed by the state’s imposition of marriage as the 
norm). As Fineman explains: 
[I] suggest that, instead of trying to fit more and more relationships into 
the legal space that marriage occupies by asserting that they are entitled to 
the same set of privileges and protection as marriage, we abolish marriage 
as a legal category. In other words, I suggest that all relationships between 
adults be nonlegal and, therefore, nonprivileged—unsubsidized by the 
state. 
Id. at 4–5. 
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Accordingly, they suggest that it is appropriate for the state to promote legal 
marriage and to elevate the rights of married couples over the rights of unmarried 
cohabitants.40 
Some experts have adopted a middle position, laying out a pluralistic vision 
in which the state legitimately promotes and privileges marriage, while also 
proliferating alternative statuses that would support committed, long-term 
relationships.41 In this vein, many of these experts have developed proposals 
intended to benefit children that would encourage committed, long-term, stable 
parental partnerships irrespective of the sexual or legal relationship of a child’s 
parents.42 Such experts have sought to reorient family law away from questions 
about marriage and toward the well-being of children. 
What are we to make of these debates and developments? Are we 
witnessing family law’s fifth transformation? That is, is the field of family law on a 
path toward more enduring, pluralistic possibilities and fundamental restructuring? 
Or rather, are we, in Kuhnian terms,43 experiencing a moment of temporary 
revolutionary upheaval that will end with a return to “normalcy” in which marriage 
 
 40. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Relationships Between Family and Government, 31 
CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1, 19–21 (2000) (arguing that the state should foster marriage above all 
other relationships among adults); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Evaluating Marriage: Does 
Marriage Matter to the Nurturing of Children?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 847, 876–79 (2005) 
(arguing that marriage matters to how children thrive and to the extent to which their parents 
are willing to invest in them and cautiously concluding that the state should encourage 
marriage); Ryan T. Anderson, The Social Costs of Abandoning the Meaning of Marriage, 
HERITAGE FOUND.: ISSUE BRIEF, no. 4038, Sept. 2013, https://thf_media.s3.
amazonaws.com/2013/pdf/ib4038.pdf (arguing that marriage encourages men and women to 
commit permanently and exclusively to each other and take responsibility for their children 
and opposing no-fault divorce, marriage equality, and other progressive marriage reforms). 
Not all scholars who oppose the disestablishment of marriage assert that marriage should be 
unchanging. See, e.g., STEPHEN MACEDO, JUST MARRIED 10–11, 79–118 (2015) (arguing that 
marriage occupies a special place in our society due to its symbolic dimension as a distinctive 
form of commitment as well as its benefits and obligations and that this is precisely why it 
should be extended to previously excluded groups such as gay and lesbian people). 
 41. See, e.g., Maxine Eichner, Marriage and the Elephant: The Liberal 
Democratic State’s Regulation of Intimate Relationships Between Adults, 30 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 25, 62–63 (2007); Shahar Lifshitz, The Pluralistic Vision of Marriage, in MARRIAGE 
AT THE CROSSROADS 260, 260–64 (Marsha Garrison & Elizabeth S. Scott eds., 2012). 
 42. See, e.g., CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES 
FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 113–22, 145–64 (2014); WEINER, supra note 13, at 131–82; Ayelet 
Blecher-Prigat, Conceiving Parents, 41 HARV. J. GENDER & L. 119, 135–46 (2018); Lifshitz, 
supra note 41, at 268–74. 
 43. A mature science, according to the philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn, 
experiences alternating phases of normal science and revolutions. In the normal science 
phase, the key theories, instruments, values, and metaphysical assumptions that comprise the 
disciplinary matrix are kept fixed, permitting the cumulative generation of solutions to 
specific problems and puzzles, whereas, in a scientific revolution, the disciplinary matrix 
undergoes revision to permit the solution of the more serious puzzles that disturbed the 
preceding period of normal science. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF 
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). 
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reasserts itself as the “measure of all things”?44 Depending on which developments 
in the field one examines, it seems that either interpretation could be accurate. 
On the one hand, the idea of marriage—however updated, reformed, and 
transformed—as the preferred institution for containing intimate and dependent 
relationships has shown impressive powers of resilience in the United States. One 
need only look at how the legalization of same-sex marriage has further entrenched 
marriage as a cultural ideal or how states and municipalities that adopted civil unions 
and domestic partnerships in the lead-up to marriage equality sunsetted these laws 
or converted these statuses to marriages.45 Furthermore, for evidence of the 
resilience of marriage (even traditional, patriarchal, heteronormative marriage), just 
consider  the proliferation of religious exemptions from American marriage laws 
now that marriage equality for same-sex couples has been won. These include 
solemnization exemptions, religious-organization exemptions, commercial 
exemptions, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) exemptions,46 
ministerial exemptions, and tax exemptions.47 In these observations, I am assisted 
by other family law historiographers and scholars who remind us to be skeptical of 
the teleological view of family law’s history. Family law has never unfolded in a 
 
 44. See Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 
2686 (2008). 
 45. See D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 175 (2016); Civil Unions and Domestic Partnership Statutes, NAT’L 
CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (July 25, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/human-
services/civil-unions-and-domestic-partnership-statutes.aspx (listing five states—
Connecticut, Delaware, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont—that have converted 
all civil unions into marriages after the legalization of same-sex marriage). 
 46. RFRA allows a person to seek an exemption from federal laws that impose a 
substantial burden on religious exercise but authorizes courts to reject such claims if enforcing 
the law is “the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest.” 42 
U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b) (2018). Almost half the states have enacted laws that mirror the 
federal RFRA and apply to state law. State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. 
OF ST. LEGISLATURES (May 4, 2017), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-
justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx. 
 47. See Leslie Griffin, Marriage Rights and Religious Exemptions in the United 
States, OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (May 2017), https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/
view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935352.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199935352-e-19; see also 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018) 
(holding that a state civil rights commission did not employ religious neutrality when it 
decided that a bakery violated the state’s antidiscrimination law by refusing the business of a 
gay couple and ordered the bakery to make a wedding cake for the couple); Brush & Nib 
Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 926–27 (Ariz. 2019) (holding that a city human 
relations ordinance precluding discrimination on basis of sexual orientation violated wedding 
invitation designers’ right to free speech and free exercise). See generally Douglas Laycock, 
Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839 (2014); Douglas NeJaime, 
Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the Production of 
Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1169 (2012); Douglas NeJaime & 
Reva Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and 
Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516 (2015). 
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straight line from the patriarchal, heteronormative family to an egalitarian, rights-
based familial order.48 
On the other hand, as a result of marriage equality (both its achievement 
and critical responses), one can detect an emergent, more profound commitment to 
pluralism in family law, especially with regard to same-sex parenting and modes of 
alternative parenting outside the marital family. For example, a majority of the 
Supreme Court implicitly recognized the validity of nonbiological, functional 
parenthood when it reasoned that nonrecognition of same-sex marriage “harm[s] and 
humiliate[s] the children of same-sex couples,”49 and when, by an even greater 
majority, the Court subsequently concluded that a state may not deny married same-
sex couples recognition on their children’s birth certificates that the state grants to 
married different-sex couples.50 In light of these marriage equality decisions, states 
have addressed the potential constitutional infirmity of their parentage laws by 
applying the presumption of parenthood equally to different- and same-sex married 
couples.51 Along the same lines, at least partly due to new understandings of family 
emanating from the marriage equality movement, states are increasingly recognizing 
and extending parental rights to people who function as parents to children with 
whom they are not biologically connected.52 Additionally, more states than ever now 
 
 48. See, e.g., Halley I, supra note 17; Halley II, supra note 21 (demonstrating the 
resilience of the market/family distinction despite sustained and organized intellectual attacks 
of this ideology by both legal realists and feminists); Martha Minow, ‘Forming Underneath 
Everything that Grows’: Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 819, 819 
(challenging the dominant account that family law has “evolve[ed] in a steady line of progress 
from the ‘traditional’ patriarchal family to an egalitarian family whose members individually 
enjoy rights protected by the state”); Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status 
Law: Adjudicating Wives’ Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2131–32 (1994) 
(recounting how the courts in the 19th century coopted statutes giving wives a right to own 
their labor by cautiously interpreting and applying them so the statutes did not fundamentally 
alter the marriage relation). 
 49. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 646 (2015). 
 50. See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078–79 (2017). 
 51. See, e.g., Henderson v. Box, 947 F.3d 482, 487 (7th Cir. 2020) (“[A]fter 
Obergefell and Pavan, a state cannot presume that a husband is the father of a child born in 
wedlock, while denying an equivalent presumption to parents in same-sex marriages.”); 
McLaughlin v. Jones, 401 P.3d 492, 498 (Ariz. 2017) (“The marital paternity presumption is 
a benefit of marriage, and following Pavan and Obergefell, the state cannot deny same-sex 
spouses the same benefits afforded opposite-sex spouses.”); Roe v. Patton, No. 2:15-CV-
00253-DB, 2015 WL 4476734, at *3 (D. Utah. July 22, 2015) (concluding that the plaintiffs 
were “highly likely to succeed in their claim” that extending the “benefits of the assisted 
reproduction statutes to male spouses in opposite-sex couples but not for female spouses in 
same-sex couples” was unconstitutional). 
 52. Several states recognize such parents under a variety of equitable doctrines—
sometimes called “de facto” parentage, “in loco parentis,” or the “psychological parent” 
doctrine. See, e.g., Bethany v. Jones, 378 S.W.3d 731, 738 (Ark. 2011) (in loco parentis); 
Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569, 576–77 (Ky. 2010) (“acting as a parent”); Boseman 
v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 504–05 (N.C. 2010) (intent and functional parenthood); McAllister 
v. McAllister, 779 N.W.2d 652, 662 (N.D. 2010) (psychological parent); Marquez v. Caudill, 
656 S.E.2d 737, 744 (S.C. 2008) (psychological parent); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 
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recognize greater than two adults as legal parents of a child under certain 
circumstances.53 These developments, one may argue, are a result of increased 
awareness of the legal needs and configurations of lesbian and gay families. Finally, 
although at its very early stages, one may now see a reform movement gaining steam 
to address the “negative consequences for sex and sexuality on marriage’s outside”54 
that have become ever more apparent with the legalization of marriage for same-sex 
couples. For example, the Uniform Law Commission55 is drafting a model act that 
would ensure that unmarried cohabitants have the same ability to contract and, upon 
termination of their relationship, obtain economic remedies, as persons who are not 
in an intimate relationship.56 
 
161, 177 (Wash. 2005) (de facto parent); In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138, 157 (W. Va. 2005) 
(psychological parent); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 549–50 (N.J. 2000) (psychological 
parent). Other states now extend rights to functional parents by statute. See, e.g., DEL. CODE 
ANN., tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (West 2020); ME. STAT. tit. 19-a, § 1891 (2016); MINN. STAT. 
§§ 257C.01–08 (West 2020); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(9) (West 2019); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 15C, § 501(a)(1)(G) (West 2020). Some states also recognize functional parents 
through case law interpreting statutes. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Ct. of El Dorado Cnty., 
117 P.3d 660, 667, 670 (Cal. 2005); In re S.N.V., 284 P.3d 147, 149 (Colo. App. 2011); 
Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542, 552–53 (Kan. 2013); Partanen v. Gallagher, 59 N.E.3d 
1133, 1139 (Mass. 2016); In re Guardianship of Madelyn B., 98 A.3d 494, 501 (N.H. 2014); 
Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3d 283, 293 (N.M. 2012). For a discussion of the functional turn in 
family law and the law’s evolving understandings of parenthood, see Doug NeJaime, The 
Constitution of Parenthood, 72 STAN. L. REV. 261, 319–43 (2020). 
 53. A handful of jurisdictions expressly permit a court to find that a child has more 
than two legal parents by statute. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West 2020); D.C. CODE 
§ 16-831.01(1)(A)(iii) (West 2020); ME. STAT. tit. 19-a, § 1853(2) (West 2019); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 15c, § 206(b) (West 2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.460(3) (West 2019). In 
addition, courts in several other states have reached that conclusion as a matter of common 
law. See, e.g., In re Interest of P.S., 505 S.W.3d 106, 109, 111 (Tex. Ct. App. 2016) (three-
way custody and visitation arrangement); A.B. v. T.V., No. 1408 WDA 2014, 2015 WL 
7571451, at *7 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 2015) (holding that trial court erred in finding “that 
granting in loco parentis standing” to former stepmother “would interfere with Child’s 
developing relationship with Mother and . . . having ‘two mothers’ would be confusing to 
Child”); McAllister, 779 N.W.2d at 661 (three-way visitation arrangement); Jacob v. Shultz-
Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (finding that parental rights or obligations 
could extend to the biological mother, nonbiological mother, and sperm donor); Warren v. 
Richard, 296 So.2d 813, 815 (La. 1974). See generally Laura T. Kessler, Community 
Parenting, 24 WASH. J.L. & POL’Y 47 (2007) [hereinafter Kessler, Community Parenting]. 
 54. See FRANKE, supra note 37, at 207. 
 55. The Uniform Law Commission, established in 1892, drafts model legislation 
for states to bring clarity and stability to critical areas of state statutory law. See About Us, 
UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/overview (last visited Sept. 10, 
2020). 
 56. See Draft Economic Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants Act, Uniform Law 
Commission (Sept. 12, 2020), https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/Download
DocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=0f2bb781-89cd-67b2-3771-4b06c15042b0&forceD
ialog=0. Specifically, the Act would provide for recognition of express and implied-in-fact 
agreements regarding unmarried cohabitants’ economic interests and rights arising within the 
context of their relationship, as well as equitable claims and remedies (with some limitations) 
upon dissolution of their cohabitation. Id. §§ 6, 7, 11–12. 
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B. Aims and Significance of this Study 
This study offers an empirical intervention to assess the field’s history and 
trajectory. It consists of a content analysis of family law casebooks published 
between 1960 and 2019. The study has both descriptive and normative purposes. 
The first purpose is to describe the academic field of family law, as legal 
thinkers and teachers inside law schools have conceptualized it, from the mid-20th 
century to the present. Such a project may prove useful to family law educators, as 
it would assist them in determining if the teaching materials typically used in family 
law courses adequately reflect the range of issues and problems that family lawyers 
encounter in contemporary family law practice. 
This study is also undertaken in recognition of the fact that the history of 
family law is still being written. Therefore, the study’s second purpose is to examine 
whether marriage remains the dominant disciplinary concern of family law and, if 
so, to steer the field in more expansive directions. Ultimately, the hope is that this 
study will inspire family law educators to self-consciously consider the ideology of 
the family that we perpetuate through legal education and to undertake an 
ideological reorganization of the field of family law so that it considers a greater 
range of intimate relationships and legal realms. 
As Susan Appleton, Adrienne Davis, Martha Fineman, Janet Halley, Jill 
Hasday, Melissa Murray, Laura Rosenbury, Zvi Triger, and many other legal 
scholars have observed, family law is notable not just for what it includes, but also 
for what it excludes. For example, although many social and legal domains have 
significant social and distributive effects on families, family law does not address 
(or only tangentially addresses) sexual pleasure,57 friendship,58 multiple 
parenthood,59 disability,60 polygamy and polyamory,61 stepfamilies,62 sibling 
 
 57. See Appleton, supra note 23, at 268–69 (noting family law’s silence on sexual 
pleasure, particularly women’s); cf. Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on 
Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 204–08 (2001) (noting the lack of 
attention in legal feminism to the connections between the regulation of families and the 
regulation of sexuality). 
 58. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189 
passim (2007) (discussing the lack of recognition of friendship as a relationship of legal 
significance in family law). 
 59. See, e.g., Kessler, Community Parenting, supra note 53, at 49 (noting that the 
“more-than-two” parent family is widely viewed as undesirable). 
 60. See HASDAY, supra note 24, at 865–66 (noting that family law hardly considers 
disability, such as laws that prohibit or restrict marriage based on disability). 
 61. See, e.g., Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, 
and Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1959 (2010) (noting that family law 
is ill equipped to deal with the complexities of polygamy); Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s 
Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 277, 281 (2004) (noting that mainstream culture accepts the restriction of two-person 
marriage without question); Kessler, supra note 18 (presenting rewritten Supreme Court 
decision that reimagines polygamy as a constitutionally protected practice). 
 62. See, e.g., Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepparents as Third Parties in Relation to 
Their Stepchildren, 40 FAM. L.Q. 81, 82 (2006) (“In spite of the long history of stepfamily 
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relationships,63 domestic workers,64 and a range of other relationships and intimate 
practices. Nor does family law, as conceptualized within legal practice and law 
school curricula, include the many areas of law that have significant distributive 
impacts on family members,65 such as tax, health insurance, real estate, education, 
bankruptcy, business associations, social security and government benefits, and 
inheritance law. These legal fields impact families, sometimes even fundamentally 
structuring a family’s economic circumstances, yet they are typically addressed by 
lawyers outside the family law bar and in other curricular territories. 
The narrow boundaries of family law have ideological effects, constructing 
the ways academics, students, judges, and policymakers think about the family and 
the questions they ask (and do not ask).66 As the widely hailed Carnegie Report on 
the best practices for legal education instructs, law schools provide rapid 
socialization into the standards of legal thinking.67 Similarly, in Duncan Kennedy’s 
words, “Because students believe what they are told, explicitly and implicitly, about 
the world they are entering, they behave in ways that fulfill the prophecies the 
system makes about them and about that world.”68 It is thus natural to begin the 
project of working out critical approaches to family law from inside law schools, 
 
issues in the legal arena, and the increased demand for regulation in recent decades, little 
progress has been made in establishing a clear or consistent legal definition of the stepparent 
status.”); id. at 107 (“The recognition of third-party claims by residential stepparents in this 
manner has caused a limited shift in the established boundaries of family in the law.”). 
 63. See, e.g., NAOMI CAHN, THE NEW KINSHIP: CONSTRUCTING DONOR-
CONCEIVED FAMILIES 61–88 (2013) (discussing donor-conceived siblings); Ruth Zafran, 
Reconceiving Legal Siblinghood, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 749, 751 (2020) (noting that family law 
is “ill-equipped” to deal with questions raised by siblinghood, especially siblings conceived 
through gamete donation). For earlier contributions to this topic, see Ellen Marrus, “Where 
Have You Been Fran?” The Right of Siblings to Seek Court Access to Override Parental 
Denial of Visitation, 66 TENN. L. REV. 977 (1999) and William Wesley Patton & Sara Latz, 
Severing Hansel from Gretel: An Analysis of Siblings’ Association Rights, 48 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 745 (1994). 
 64. See Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal 
Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 388 (2008) (arguing for 
broader legal recognition of caregiving networks and nonparental caregivers); Zvi Triger, 
Introducing the Political Family: A New Road Map for Critical Family Law, 13 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 361, 379–80 (2012) (highlighting how legal authorities have defined paid 
caregivers outside of the field of family law and raising the question of whether noncitizen 
migrant nannies should be afforded some legal status in the family). 
 65. See Halley I, supra note 17, at 5–6; Halley II, supra note 21 at 192 (urging a 
“reconnect[ion] [of] domestic relations/family law not only with the market but with the vast 
array of regulatory orders, inside and outside the state, that condition its lifeways”). 
 66. See HASDAY, supra note 24, at 3–5. 
 67. See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR 
THE PROFESSION OF LAW 47–86, 185–86 (2007) [hereinafter THE CARNEGIE REPORT]. 
 68. See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A 
Polemic Against the System, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 591, 591 (1982). For discussions of how 
disciplines reproduce ideologies, both generally and in educational institutions, see MAGALI 
SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977), KEITH 
M. MACDONALD, THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS (1999), and LOUIS ALTHUSSER, 
Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, in LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 
121–76 (Ben Brewster trans., 1971). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3739733
2020] FAMILY LAW BY THE NUMBERS 919 
where future lawyers (of all specialties) and legal decisionmakers, who exercise 
considerable power in society over family law and families, are first exposed to the 
field. Further, as members of professional schools, law school faculties are deeply 
immersed in the development of the law, not only through their research,69 but also 
more directly through participation in impact litigation and law reform commissions 
and other expert bodies. As such, studying the academic discipline of family law, as 
it is conceptualized and taught within legal education, can tell us quite a bit about 
“the ways of thinking about family that are widely shared . . . by legal authorities.”70 
In sum, the academic discipline of family law is an important artifact that both 
reflects and produces the ideology of the family, however complex and indirect its 
relationship to the “law of family law” developed by courts, legislatures, and 
government agencies.71 For these reasons, academic family law is worthy of study 
by those interested in the role of the family and family law in ordering social 
relations. 
This study is also of personal significance, as it provides an opportunity for 
me to test my earlier hypotheses about the future direction of the field of family law. 
In 2008, I published a book chapter titled New Frontiers in Family Law72 when the 
marriage equality movement was gaining significant momentum in the United 
States.73 I argued that a broader range of family relationships and sexual practices 
was displacing marriage as the central subject of scholarly inquiry on the family, 
 
 69. There is a large body of legal scholarship on the relevance of legal scholarship 
to the practice and development of law. See, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan, Legal Scholarship Makes 
the World a Better Place (Nov. 7, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2975813; Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between 
Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2191 passim (1992); Deborah J. 
Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges and Scholars: Do Courts and Scholarly Journals Cite the 
Same Law Review Articles?, 71 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 871 passim (1996); Lee Petherbridge 
& David L. Schwartz, An Empirical Assessment of the Supreme Court’s Use of Legal 
Scholarship, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 1016–27 (2012); Diane P. Wood, Legal Scholarship 
for Judges, 124 YALE L.J. 2592 passim (2015). 
 70. See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 825 
(2004). 
 71. Given the porosity of the boundaries between legal education and the legal 
profession, I hesitate to call law outside law schools “law in the real world.” 
 72. Kessler, New Frontiers, supra note 14. 
 73. Although the gay liberation movement began in the 1960s in the United States, 
the civil rights movement for legal recognition of same-sex marriage did not gain real traction 
until 1993, when a decision of the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 
(Haw. 1993), seemed to imply that same-sex marriage might be legally required. The Baehr 
decision was the “first olive out of the jar,” so to speak. However, the real game-changer 
occurred in 2003, when the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled in Goodridge v. 
Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), that the ban on same-sex marriage 
violated the state constitution. By 2011, when New Frontiers in Family Law was published, 
the movement had gained significant steam, as had the anti-same-sex-marriage movement. 
For example, in November 2008, California passed a referendum called “Proposition 8,” 
which nullified a California Supreme Court decision striking down California’s same-sex 
marriage ban, but only after 14,000 same-sex couples had been married there. See MICHAEL 
J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2013). 
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and I identified four intellectual shifts in the field’s scholarly agenda resulting from 
the waning interest in marriage.74 Specifically, based on my review of family law 
scholarship published in the first decade of the 21st century, I found pervasive 
evidence of new mindsets among family law scholars. Family law researchers, I 
argued, were more attentive to the state’s role in supporting families,75 concerned 
with a greater variety of intimate configurations,76 and interested in developing 
family law so that it better supports sexual and other freedoms.77 They were also 
pushing their research into fields of law that historically were not considered family 
law, such as constitutional, tax, immigration, criminal, and employment law.78 
I characterized this transformation as a “new frontier” in family law 
scholarship and mapped out four potential paths for family law’s future. Potential 
Path 1: With continued diffusion and expansion and the end of its raison d’ existence 
(marriage) as a social ideal and institution of legal significance, family law may 
move toward obsolescence and eventually disappear as a coherent field of 
knowledge.79 Potential Path 2: As family law adds new statuses, recognizes a greater 
range of intimate relationships, and enters new legal domains, a much broader field 
may emerge, “the Law of Intimacy.”80 Potential Path 3: Nonmarital relationships—
and the problems of gender, sexuality, race, and economic inequality and the 
family—will be banished to the wilderness of specialized “law and” classes and 
seminars, such as Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Race Theory, Poverty Law, and 
Gender, Sexuality, and the Law, due to resistance from within the discipline by 
academics who remain committed to marriage. In this last scenario, family law’s 
traditional focus on middle-class families and on marriage would be preserved.81 
Potential Path 4: All three of the posited routes would occur to some degree. Thus: 
(a) Some family law topics will break off and migrate to other fields of law—for 
example, the topic of marriage equality for same-sex couples, I hypothesized in 
2008, could eventually be claimed by Constitutional Law or Sexuality, Gender, and 
the Law; (b) Other parts of family law, I surmised, might become obsolete—for 
example, there will come a point when fault-based divorce grounds are relegated to 
the dust bins of family law casebooks (the endnotes), like the “heart-balm” claims 
of yesteryear; and (c) What remains will then become a slightly expanded field 
concerned with a fuller range of legal relationships, perhaps Super Modern Family 
Law, but still primarily focused on marriage.82 This empirical study provides an 
opportunity to test some of these earlier predictions about the field’s possible 
direction through the examination of a rich data set of 86 American family law 
casebooks published from 1960 to 2019. 
 
 74. See Kessler, New Frontiers, supra note 14, at 226–27, 230–35. 
 75. Id. at 230. 
 76. Id. at 233. 
 77. Id. at 231. 
 78. Id. at 234. 
 79. Id. at 237–39. 
 80. Id. at 239–40. 
 81. Id. at 240–41. 
 82. Id. at 241. 
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I. METHODOLOGY 
Over the last 60 years, scores of family law casebooks have been published 
and widely used in legal education at hundreds of law schools. This study describes 
and tracks their topical coverage over time through a content analysis. Content 
analysis is a research method that has come into wide use in many disciplines in 
recent years; it is a flexible method for analyzing text data.83 Quantitative 
approaches to content analysis, employed in this study, count the frequency of a set 
of codes to get a sense of what is in the data.84 Quantitative content analysis typically 
employs a deductive approach, with the codes predetermined and drawn from 
outside the existing data, typically from existing theory or prior research.85 A 
quantitative approach to content analysis is most suitable when prior research exists 
about a phenomenon that is incomplete or would benefit from further description.86 
Qualitative content analysis, in contrast, employs an inductive approach.87 
Researchers develop the codes from the text itself, then use the codes to develop 
new insights into the data. Qualitative content analysis is most suitable when theory 
generation is the goal of the research.88 When the sample is representative, and the 
categories are sufficiently defined so that all coders will reach the same conclusions, 
content analysis is both reliable and valid.89 I selected a quantitative approach for 
this study, because one of my goals is to test my earlier theories about the extent of 
coverage of specific topics in the field of family law (particularly the core areas of 
marriage, divorce, child custody, and child support).90 
 
 83. Stephen Cavanagh, Content Analysis: Concepts, Methods and Applications, 4 
NURSE RESEARCHER 5, 5 (1997). Content analysis is one of numerous research methods used 
to analyze text data; other methods include ethnography, grounded theory, phenomenology, 
and historical research. See Hsiu-Fang Hsieh & Sarah E. Shannon, Three Approaches to 
Qualitative Content Analysis, 15 QUALITATIVE HEALTH RES. 1277, 1278 (2005). 
 84. See David. L. Morgan, Qualitative Content Analysis: A Guide to Paths Not 
Taken, 3 QUALITATIVE HEALTH RES. 112, 115 (1993). 
 85. See BRUCE L. BERG, QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS FOR THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 233–52 (3d ed. 1998). 
 86. See Hsieh & Shannon, supra note 83, at 1281. 
 87. See BERG, supra note 85. 
 88. See Hsieh & Shannon, supra note 83, at 1279–80. 
 89. See OLE R. HOLSTI, CONTENT ANALYSIS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND 
HUMANITIES 127–42 (1969); Marijke Breuning, Content Analysis, in 21ST CENTURY 
POLITICAL SCIENCE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 490, 494–95 (John T. Ishiyama & Marijke 
Breuning eds., 2011).  
 90. To increase reliability consistent with best practices, the categories used in this 
study were pretested in a series of trials and repeatedly redefined before they were finalized 
to ensure that the coding system was clear and unambiguous. See Cavanaugh, supra note 83, 
at 10–11. This “repeated movement of the researcher between the data and content analysis” 
study also generated new categories. Id. at 11. As such, the study incorporates an inductive, 
qualitative element as well. “Inductive and deductive approaches are not mutually exclusive, 
and it is often useful to apply both,” as researchers can strengthen a quantitative content 
analyses with the addition of an initial qualitative analysis. See Nancy L. Kondracki et al., 
Content Analysis: Review of Methods and Their Applications in Nutrition Education, 34 J. 
NUTRITION EDUC. & BEHAV. 224, 225 (2002). 
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It is important to note at the outset the strengths and limitations of a content 
analysis. Content analysis provides a technical advantage when a large volume of 
material exceeds an investigator’s ability to qualitatively analyze data.91 This 
method presents a particular advantage in this study, which evaluates 96,762 pages 
of casebook text. Content analysis is also useful when it is not practical to interview 
or survey subjects, as here, when many professors who authored or used the 
casebooks in this study are retired or deceased. Although not a perfect reflection of 
classroom activities, casebooks provide a rough record of the content of family law 
instruction.92 Finally, the frequency of a set of assertions or codes can, inferentially, 
provide a window into their importance. A content analysis thus fits well with this 
study’s aim to assess the direction of the academic field of family law in the past 
half-century and, in particular, the centrality of marriage as the field’s organizing 
framework and purpose. What can a content analysis not do? It cannot determine 
the truth of an assertion. It cannot, without additional qualitative analysis, explain 
the social meaning or context of the categories analyzed. For example, 1960s 
casebooks often examined divorce, “homosexuality,” and nonmarital cohabitation 
in a negative light.93 In other words, a content analysis cannot tell us what the 
casebook authors in this study think so much as what they think about. This study is 
intended to supplement the existing abundant and exemplary qualitative scholarship 
examining family law’s canonical texts.94 
The 86 casebooks chosen for this study were identified through WorldCat, 
a global catalog of library collections.95 Using the advanced search option in 
WorldCat, books were selected by searching for the subject “domestic relations 
United States cases” that were published between 1960 and 2019.96 Next, the results 
were refined by selecting only law casebooks intended for use in legal education, 
excluding e-books and microfiche, single state and region-specific books, teachers’ 
 
 91. See HOLSTI, supra note 89, at 17. 
 92. Id. at 16. 
 93. See, e.g., CALEB FOOTE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 3 
(1966) (discussing the “problem of illegitimacy”); ALBERT C. JACOBS & JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 268 (1961) (addressing annulment and divorce 
under the heading “family disorganization”); MORRIS PLOSCOWE & DORIS JONAS FREED, 
FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 153–54 (1963) (addressing homosexuality only in a 
section on sodomy as cruelty, adultery, or criminal activity); id. at 629 (addressing the 
lawyer’s role in limiting divorce by facilitating marital reconciliation). 
 94. See generally HASDAY, supra note 24; GLENDON, supra note 22; Halley I, 
supra note 17; Halley II, supra note 21; Kessler, New Frontiers, supra note 14. For an 
example of vein of inquiry outside the United States, see Ayelet Blecher-Prigat & Ruth 
Zafran, Evaluating 40 (and More) Years of Family Studies, 40 TEL AVIV L. REV. 547 (2017) 
(in Hebrew). 
 95. WorldCat is a union catalog that itemizes the collections of 72,000 libraries in 
170 countries and territories that participate in the Online Computer Library Center 
(“OCLC”) global cooperative. It is operated by OCLC Online Computer Library Center, Inc. 
The subscribing member libraries collectively maintain WorldCat’s database, the world’s 
largest bibliographic database. See What is WorldCat?, WORLDCAT, 
https://www.worldcat.org/whatis/default.jsp (last visited Aug. 1, 2020). 
 96. Although most American casebooks discarded the designation “domestic 
relations” by the 1980s, WorldCat continues to classify family law books using this 
designation. See Appendix, infra. 
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manuals, casebook supplements, law school study aids, treatises, and continuing 
legal education practice books. Additionally, several books that address fields of 
which family law is only a small subfield, such as casebooks on poverty law and sex 
equality, were eliminated due to the potentially skewing nature these books would 
have on this study’s results.97 Of the remaining books, a search was conducted for 
editions of each casebook that may not have been captured by the initial selection 
method. These later editions were added to the data. The overall purpose of this 
selection method was to identify and include casebooks published between 1960 and 
2019 developed as teaching materials for the basic introductory course in family 
law. Given the selection method and the relatively small number of family law 
casebooks published since 1960 (less than 100), this study quite literally occupies 
the field.98 The selected books were grouped according to the decade in which they 
were published. Specifically, the books were broken down into six decades: 1960–
1969, 1970–1979, 1980–1989, 1990–1999, 2000–2009, and 2010–2019. 
The casebooks were then coded by subject by counting the pages dedicated 
to each designated subject, excluding blank pages and each book’s preface, 
introduction, table of contents, table of cases, and index. The coding categories 
consisted of four “core” family law topics: (1) marriage;99 (2) divorce;100 (3) child 
custody;101 and (4) child support;102 and twelve “noncore” family law topics: (1) 
adoption;103 (2) alternative dispute resolution;104 (3) assisted reproduction;105 (4) 
cohabitation;106 (5) family violence;107 (6) foster care/child welfare;108 (7) juvenile 
 
 97. Specifically, because the content of such topically-focused casebooks lie 
mostly outside of family law, and this study measures topical content as a percentage of the 
books’ overall content, their inclusion could result in an inaccurate underrepresentation of the 
family law topics covered in these books. More generally, these books were eliminated 
because they are not intended for family law instruction. 
 98. An Appendix is included at the end of this Article with all of the casebooks 
included in the study. 
 99. Premarital agreements, procedural and substantive requirements for entering 
marriage (including annulment if not met), and the legal and economic consequences of an 
existing marriage. 
 100. Fault grounds for divorce, no-fault divorce, and economic consequences of 
divorce, including spousal support, property division, separation agreements. 
 101. Issues of child custody, including jurisdiction, modification, enforcement, and 
visitation, irrespective of parents’ marital status. 
 102. Issues relating to child support, including jurisdiction, modification, and 
enforcement, irrespective of parents’ marital status. 
 103. All issues relating to adoption. 
 104. Family mediation. 
 105. In vitro fertilization, surrogacy agreements, and legal issues related to other 
reproductive technologies, including parentage. 
 106. Common law marriage, cohabitation, contract rights, and third-party rights 
vis-à-vis unmarried partners. 
 107. Violence between spouses/domestic partners and family torts. 
 108. Child abuse, child neglect, infanticide, foster care issues, and children in the 
child welfare system. 
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justice;109 (8) lawyers’ role in family law disputes;110 (9) LGBT issues;111 (10) 
parent/child/state;112 (11) race and family law;113 and (12) reproductive rights.114 
This coding scheme by no means represents all of the potential categories covered 
in basic family law casebooks or courses or the only way to slice up the discipline. 
However, these categories provide a reasonable representation of the categories that 
casebook authors consider important, and they mirror the way casebooks commonly 
group family law topics. 
II. FINDINGS 
A. Core vs. Noncore Family Law 
Table 1 below presents the percentage of casebook pages covering core and 
noncore family law topics from the 1960s through the 2010s. The percentage of 
casebook pages dedicated to core family law declined by approximately 16 
percentage points since the 1960s, with a corresponding increase in casebook pages 
dedicated to noncore family law issues. Whereas core family law (marriage, divorce, 
child support, and child custody) constituted almost 75% of casebook pages in the 
1960s, by the 2010s these topics constituted just under 60% of casebook pages. Of 
note, since the 1980s, the percentage of casebook pages dedicated to core family law 
has remained relatively stable in the range of 55% to 60%. A graph depicting the 
trend in casebook content dedicated to core family law in the six decades from the 
1960s to the 2010s is represented in Figure 1.  
 
 109. Children in the criminal justice system. 
 110. Professional responsibility issues, including those relating to dual 
representation and billing. 
 111. Same-sex cohabitation and marriage; cases involving custody disputes, 
adoption, and foster care by gay parents. 
 112. The constitutional dimensions of the parent/child relationship; parentage, 
including nonmarital fathers’ rights; children’s constitutional rights 
 113. Interracial marriage, interracial adoption, race and custody, and racial bias in 
child welfare hearings. 
 114. Abortion and contraception. Importantly, the 12 noncore family law topics 
were counted in multiple noncore categories where appropriate—for example, interracial 
adoption would be included in both the “adoption” and “race and family law” categories. 
However, there was no overlap in the coding of the four core family law topics. For example, 
a legal decision involving both child custody and child support would be placed in one or the 
other category, depending on where in the casebook the author placed the case and an 
assessment of the bulk of the substantive content of the decision. The purpose of this approach 
was to ensure an accurate measure of core family law topics (defined as marriage, divorce, 
child custody, and child support) as a proportion of casebook coverage, compared with 
noncore topics (everything else). 
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Figure 1. Percentage of casebook pages covering core family law topics 
(marriage, divorce, child custody, and child support), by decade, 1960s to 
2010s 
 
B. Changes in the Coverage of Core Family Law Topics 
As illustrated in Table 2, below, in looking at each of the specific topics 
that make up the core of family law (marriage, divorce, child custody, child support) 
over the six decades from the 1960s to the 2010s, the percentage of casebook pages 
dedicated to marriage and divorce decreased, while pages dedicated to child custody 
and child support increased. The percentage of casebook pages dedicated to 
marriage and divorce almost halved. Child custody’s share of pages nearly doubled, 
and child support’s share of pages more than tripled. Despite the decrease over time, 
divorce consistently represents the greatest proportion of pages in the family law 
casebooks sampled. Figure 2, below, shows the overall trends in coverage of core 
family law topics from the 1960s to the 2010s. 







Table 1. Percentage of casebook pages covering core and noncore family 
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Figure 2. Casebook coverage of core family law topics, by decade, 1960s to 
2010s 
  
Year Marriage Divorce Child        Custody
Child         
Support
1960s 30.0% 34.2% 7.8% 2.5%
1970s 24.4% 28.2% 8.6% 2.7%
1980s 18.7% 25.1% 11.9% 4.4%
1990s 18.6% 20.6% 12.1% 5.7%
2000s 16.6% 18.5% 13.5% 6.8%
2010s 17.4% 19.7% 14.2% 7.6%
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Table 3 shows the percentage change in each core family law topic from 
the decade preceding it. For example, the percentage of pages dedicated to marriage 
and divorce decreased by 42.0% and 42.3%, respectively, from the 1960s to the 
2010s. During that same period, the percentage of pages dedicated to child custody 





 It is also useful to look at each core topic individually. 
1. Marriage 
As Table 4 below illustrates, after the 1960s, the percentage of the 
casebook pages dedicated to marriage decreased each decade until the 2010s, when 
it increased slightly. This uptick could be due to the acceleration of court decisions 
addressing marriage equality for same-sex couples from 2000 to 2019.115  Overall, 
the percentage of pages in the casebooks covering marriage decreased by almost 
half from the 1960s to the 2010s. A graph depicting these trends is represented in 
Figure 3, below. 
 
 
 115. In chronological order, some of these decisions are: Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); In re 
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013); 
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 772 (2013); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 
(2015). The exceptions are two important same-sex marriage cases decided in the 1990s. See 
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). Because 
authors and publishers typically release updated editions of casebooks every three to five 
years, one would expect a delay before these cases made their way into family law casebooks. 
Change from        





1960s – 1970s - 18.7% - 17.5% 9.9% 10.8%
1970s – 1980s - 23.5% - 10.9% 38.7% 62.0%
1980s – 1990s - 0.6% - 18.1% 2.0% 29.4%
1990s – 2000s - 10.8% - 10.0% 11.2% 18.0%
2000s – 2010s 5.2% 6.4% 5.2% 12.6%
Total % change 
1960s – 2010s - 42.0% - 42.3% 81.9% 208.8%
Table 3. Percentage change in casebook coverage of core family law topics, 
by decade, 1960s to 2010s
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2. Divorce 
Table 5 shows that since the 1960s, the percentage of casebook pages 
dedicated to divorce decreased each decade until the 2010s, when there was a slight 
uptick. Overall, the percentage of pages dedicated to divorce decreased by almost 
half from the 1960s to the 2010s. A graph depicting this decreasing trend in divorce 
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3. Child Custody 
Table 6 below shows that the percentage of casebook pages dedicated to 
child custody has generally increased since the 1960s. Although child custody 
represents a small portion of the casebook pages in this study (ranging from 8% to 
14%), the coverage nearly doubled from the 1960s to the 2010s. The upward trend 





Figure 5. Percentage of casebook pages covering child custody, by decade, 
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4. Child Support 
The percentage of casebook pages dedicated to child support also increased 
since the 1960s, indeed dramatically, more than tripling from the 1960s to the 2010s, 
as set forth in Table 7 below. Like child custody, child support represents a very 
small share of the analyzed casebooks, constituting just 2%–8% over the past 60 
years. The clear upward trend in casebook pages dedicated to child support is 





Figure 6. Percentage of casebook pages covering child support, by decade, 
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C. Changes in the Coverage of Noncore Family Law Topics 
With regard to noncore topics, there are some clear trends. A substantial 
increase in coverage can be found in alternative dispute resolution, assisted 
reproduction, cohabitation, family violence, LGBT issues, and race and family law. 
In contrast, coverage of child welfare, juvenile justice, “parent, child, and the state,” 
and reproductive rights have trended downwards, at least since the 1980s or 1990s. 
Evidence suggests that these decreases may have occurred because these topics now 
receive enough attention to merit their own casebooks and courses.116 
 
Figure 7. Percentage of casebook pages covering noncore family law topics, 
by decade, 1960s to 2010s 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
The findings described above do not reveal why casebook authors decided 
to include certain topics or exclude others, or why they dedicated more content to 
some topics than others. Nor do the findings directly measure how lawyers or judges 
understand the field and define family law. However, the findings do reveal the 
topics that family law casebooks have addressed over the past 60 years and shifts in 
topical coverage during this period.117 The findings also shed some light on the 
 
 116. See, e.g., BARRY C. FELD & PERRY L. MORIEARTY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION (5th ed. 2018); LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, 
CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND THE LAW: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN THE HOME, SCHOOLS, 
AND JUVENILE COURTS (4th ed. 2020); ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, 
FAMILY, AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW (7th ed. 2014); 
MELISSA MURRAY & KRISTIN LUKER, CASES ON REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE (2015). 
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bigger questions animating this study: how has the discipline of family law evolved 
(or not evolved) over the past half-century, where might it be headed, and what is 
the continued significance of marriage in the field? 
The results demonstrate that, first, the core of the academic field of family 
law has remained relatively stable in the past 60 years. Marriage, divorce, child 
custody, and child support continue to dominate the topics presented in family law 
casebooks, with these topics constituting approximately 55% to 75% of their 
content.118 At the same time, there has been a discernible shift in priorities within 
family law’s core. Topical coverage of marriage and divorce in family law 
casebooks has decreased since the 1960s, each by about 40%.119 In contrast, pages 
dedicated to child custody and child support have increased, together more than 
doubling their share.120 That is, although marriage and divorce, as a whole, still 
receive the majority of attention as a percentage of casebook coverage, legal 
questions concerning children have partially replaced marriage and divorce.121 
The findings of this study are also notable for what is “not” family law. My 
earlier research hypothesizing that noncore topics and nonmarital relationships may 
eventually overtake the field, resulting in an expansion of the discipline into a more 
capacious field conceptualized as “the Law of Intimacy,” is unconfirmed by this 
study.122 Together, family law concerns such as cohabitation, assisted reproduction, 
race and the family, and reproductive rights remain the minority of family law 
casebook coverage, hovering around 40% since the 1980s, and there does not appear 
to be any disruption in the balance between core family law (marriage, divorce, child 
custody, and child support) and noncore family law topics (everything else) in the 
past 40 years. In sum, while this study finds a substantial increase in relative 
coverage of the parent/child relationship and a corresponding decrease in the relative 
coverage of marriage and divorce in family law casebooks published from 1960 to 
2019, the outer boundaries of the discipline of family law appear to be quite 
 
 118. See supra Table 1 and Figure 1. 
 119. See supra Table 2, Table 3, and Figure 2. 
 120. See supra Table 2, Table 3, and Figure 2. 
 121. In these trends, one can see the influence and prescience of experts, such as 
Martha Fineman. Twenty-five years ago, in her pathbreaking book, The Neutered Mother, 
Fineman called on policymakers and academic experts to examine what adjustments are 
necessary to help new forms of family, many of which are raising children, meet their 
responsibilities. See FINEMAN, supra note 13, at 7–8. She argued that it was time for 
policymakers to refocus their attention and energy on the caretaker-dependent relationship. 
Id. at 9. As she explained, the gender revolution in marriage had been actualized or at least 
reached its limits, and therefore, marriage no longer justified the intense attention given by 
policymakers and legal thinkers. Id. at 7. Moreover, the view of marriage as the cure for all 
social ills, she argued, hides the ugly reality of marriage’s inherently exclusionary nature, as 
well as the larger social and economic forces that are destructive to families and children 
within families. See id. at 5. In light of this analysis, she argued that the state must also bear 
some responsibility for the well-being of children and stop blaming nonnuclear families for 
economic forces beyond their control and the insufficient scope of government safeguards 
from poverty. See id. at 106–42, 213–17. 
 122. See Kessler, New Frontiers, supra note 14, at 239–40. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3739733
934 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 62:903 
stubborn. In this Part, I discuss the implications of these findings for legal education, 
law school curricula, and the ideology of the family. 
A. Implications for Legal Education and Law School Curricula 
Family law experts note that the last two decades have seen substantial 
changes in the practice of family law, yet “law school curricula and teaching have 
remained relatively static.”123 Accordingly, family law education reformers have 
called on law schools to update their curricula to ensure lawyers are prepared to 
address the many issues and contexts encountered by today’s family lawyers. 
Among other recommendations, it is urged that family law curricula must (1) include 
more interdisciplinary instruction on topics such as family systems theory, child 
psychology, and family violence;124 (2) emphasize a broad range of skills, including 
listening, counseling, communicating, and managing;125 (3) provide instruction on 
the role and methodologies of alternative dispute resolution, which has widely 
displaced traditional litigation in family courts;126 and (4) address professional 
ethics, including lawyers’ conduct as it relates to clients127 and nonlawyer 
professionals.128 Finally, educational reformers argue that (5) the family law 
curriculum would better prepare lawyers for the realities of contemporary practice 
if family law courses exposed law students to a broader range of topics, especially 
those influencing the economics of the family, such as tax, contracts, retirement 
benefits, real estate, and health insurance continuation (COBRA).129 
The findings of this study suggest that family law casebooks may constitute 
a barrier to this larger reform agenda. Family law casebooks continue to focus on 
marriage, divorce, child custody, and child support to the exclusion of the multitude 
of other fields of law that impact family relationships and the economics of the 
family. For example, this study finds that professional ethics and alternative dispute 
resolution are only a marginal aspect casebook content, with professional ethics 
 
 123. Mary E. O’Connell & J. Herbie DiFonzo, The Family Law Education Reform 
Project Final Report, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 524, 524–25 (2006). 
 124. Id. at 525. 
 125. Id. at 547. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. Some of the ethical questions unique to family law practice, for example, 
are: How should lawyers meet their ethical obligations to their clients in the nonadversary 
context in which family law conflicts are often resolved? How can lawyers vigorously 
advocate for clients without increasing conflict between the parties? Id. at 540. The call for 
increased training and focus on professional ethics in family law education is consistent with 
broader legal education reform initiatives. See AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL EDUCATION AND 
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT―AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE 
ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 4–5, 138–40 (1992) 
(identifying “recognizing and resolving ethical dilemmas” as one of the ten essential 
lawyering skills on which law schools must focus). 
 128. See O’Connell & DiFonzo, supra note 123, at 540, 566 n.122. 
 129. Id. at 122. “COBRA” is the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act. 
This law is the vehicle for the continuation of health insurance when an insured person’s link 
to a providing employer is severed, including by divorce. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161–1169 
(2018). 
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(“lawyers role”) making up just 2.2% of the content of casebooks published in the 
last decade and alternative dispute resolution 1.9% in the same period.130 
Although this study did not analyze casebooks for topics related to skills or 
skills content, a qualitative examination of the content of the 86 casebooks studied 
reveals that most of the pages are devoted to case material or statutes, with the vast 
bulk of those pages consisting of case law. It is widely acknowledged that the case 
method,131 cherished by generations of law professors and ingrained in our teaching 
texts, provides a distorted understanding of the nature of the practice of law.132 
While there is no doubt that discerning, synthesizing, and applying legal rules are 
essential skills to the competent practice of law, they represent only a small fraction 
of those that lawyers need, especially family lawyers who spend only a small part 
of their time in litigation.133 
To be sure, anecdotal evidence suggests that most family law professors 
supplement their casebook reading assignments with outside materials, such as 
problems, social science studies, news articles, law review articles, and statutes.134 
Certainly, today, there exists a breadth of materials that teachers can draw on so that 
their courses incorporate alternative topics and competencies. For example, many 
casebooks now include companion websites or teachers’ manuals with simulation 
problems that family law professors can incorporate into the basic family law 
course.135 Moreover, the Family Law Education Reform Project, a joint project of 
the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, Hofstra Law School, and the 
William Mitchell College of Law, has developed simulation exercises for family law 
teachers that assist educators in ensuring that their courses prepare students for the 
modern practice of family law.136 Scholarly communities of professors who teach 
130. See supra Figure 7.
131. The case method is a pedagogical method for teaching law. It was invented by 
Christopher Columbus Langdell, who served as the Dean of Harvard Law School from 1870 
to 1895. See The Case Study Teaching Method, HARV. L. SCH., 
https://casestudies.law.harvard.edu/the-case-study-teaching-method/#:~:text=The%20case%
20method%20in%20legal,that%20furthered%20principles%20or%20doctrines (last visited 
Aug. 25, 2020). Langdell’s case method systematized and simplified legal education by 
focusing on case law that furthered principles or doctrines. Id. Langdell wrote the first 
casebook, entitled A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts, a collection of settled cases 
that, in his view, illuminated the then-current state of contract law. Id. Students were required 
to read the cases and come to class prepared to analyze them in a Socratic question-and-
answer session in class. Id. 
132. See THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 67, at 60, 186–88; Todd Rakoff &
Martha Minow, A Case for Another Case Method, 60 VAND. L. REV. 597, 600–02 (2007). 
133. See O’Connell & DiFonzo, supra note 123, at 528, 559 n.19.
134. This Author, for example, incorporates extensive supplemental materials on
domestic violence, alternative dispute resolution, working with custody experts, and 
professional ethics. 
135. See, e.g., Casebook Companion: Abrams, Cahn, Ross, and McClain’s
Contemporary Family Law, 5th Edition, WEST ACAD. PUBL’G, http://www.abrams-
familylaw.com/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2020). 
136. See Welcome to the Family Law Education Reform (FLER) Project Website,
FAM. L. EDUC. REFORM PROJECT, https://www.flerproject.org/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2020). 
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and write in family law also serve as a resource for sharing problems, pedagogical 
innovations, and materials.137 
Nevertheless, casebooks create a strong pull for law teachers, who have 
many demands, not the least of which is research, which receives priority in most 
institutions. It is understandable, then, that casebooks serve as the bread and butter 
of teaching materials in the core law school curriculum, given the natural 
efficiencies casebooks afford, the absence of institutional incentives to undertake 
the work of continually supplementing casebooks, and the time-intensive nature of 
skills training. Moreover, even if a professor supplements the casebook, which is 
quite common, casebooks send a strong implicit message about what is important, 
since they represent the “official” version of the field. As compared to a published 
book, a professor’s supplemental materials or exercises may be perceived by 
students as less authoritative or important. As such, family law casebooks are highly 
influential in socializing lawyers into the field of family law. 
The content analysis undertaken in this study suggests that family law 
casebooks, by focusing primarily on core family law topics, present an incomplete 
picture of the many domains of law that regulate families, such as business, 
employment, tax, health, immigration, and government benefits law. They also paint 
an incomplete and distorted picture of the nature of the practice of family law by 
focusing primarily on the adversarial dispute process of litigation rather than 
counseling, problem solving, and alternative dispute resolution. 
It is worth pausing to consider what has caused this state of affairs. One 
obvious contributing factor, perhaps the tail wagging the dog, is the bar exam. The 
majority of jurisdictions in the United States, including 36 states, the District of 
Columbia, and the Virgin Islands, have adopted the Uniform Bar Exam (“UBE”).138 
The UBE offers law students licensing flexibility in an increasingly transnational 
legal market by providing a standardized, portable bar test score.139 The National 
Conference of Bar Examiners (“NCBE”),140 developed the UBE with the goal that 
 
 137. For example, the annual Family Law Scholars and Teachers Conference 
traditionally includes a plenary panel on family law pedagogy. The session provides family 
law teachers the opportunity to share instructional strategies that they have used in their 
classrooms and share simulation exercises, group-based work, visuals, or any other strategies 
that they use to help their students learn. See, e.g., Announcement, Thirteenth Annual Family 
Law Scholars and Teachers (FLST) Conference, Brooklyn Law School, June 16, 2020 (on 
file with author). 
 138. See Jurisdictions that Have Adopted the UBE, NCBE, 
http://www.ncbex.org/exams/ube/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2020). Additionally, although not 
UBE states for reciprocity purposes, three states―Hawaii, Mississippi, and South 
Dakota―administer all four parts of the UBE. See Preparing for the Bar Exam: HI, REGENT 
U. L. LIBR.  (July 30, 2020), https://libguides.regent.edu/barexam/HI; Preparing for the Bar 
Exam: MS, REGENT U. L. LIBR. (July 30, 2020), https://libguides.regent.edu/barexam/MS; 
Preparing for the Bar Exam: SD, REGENT U. L. LIBR. (July 30, 2020), 
https://libguides.regent.edu/barexam/SD.  
 139. See Jonathan Lippman, Embracing the Uniform Bar Exam in New York: 
Toward A More Rational Bar Admissions Process Promoting Essential Lawyer Mobility, 23 
PROF. LAW. 8, 9 (2016). 
 140. The NCBE is a nonprofit, initially founded in 1931, to improve legal testing 
across the country. Id. 
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all jurisdictions will implement the test, resulting in one nationwide, portable bar 
exam.141 
The UBE consists of three parts: the Multistate Bar Examination 
(“MBE”),142 Multistate Essay Exam (“MEE”),143 and Multistate Performance Test 
(“MPT”).144 The MEE is the portion of the UBE that covers family law,145 with 
family law representing one of 12 possible subject areas tested by essay.146 The 
NCBE provides an outline of family law topics that states may test on the MEE, 
including “getting married,” “being married,” “separation,” “divorce,” “dissolution 
and annulment,” “child custody,” the “rights of unmarried cohabitants,” “adoption 
and alternatives to adoption,” and “parent, child, and state.”147 Surveying past exams 
and materials from commercial bar review companies reveals the MEE most 
commonly tests core family law topics as defined in this study, i.e., marriage, 
divorce, child custody, and child support.148 
Indeed, an analysis of MEE exams administered from February 2008 to 
February 2000 reveals that almost all of the family law questions fall within the 
 
 141. Id. The UBE was first implemented in February 2011, when North Dakota and 
Missouri became the first two states to administer the test. See James Podgers, One for All the 
Uniform Bar Exam Is Picking Up Steam, 96 A.B.A. J. 56, 56–57 (2010). The National 
Conference of Bar Examiners (NCBE) created the UBE as an extension of its work on the 
MBE, MEE, and MPT, the three sections of the UBE that many states already used. Dennis 
R. Honabach, To UBE or Not to UBE: Reconsidering the Uniform Bar Exam, 22 PROF. LAW. 
43, 47 (2014). 
 142. The MBE is a 200-question, multiple-choice exam that covers seven key areas 
of law: civil procedure, constitutional law, contracts, criminal law and procedure, evidence, 
real property, and torts. Preparing for the MBE, NCBE, 
https://www.ncbex.org/exams/mbe/preparing/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2020). 
 143. The MEE includes six essay questions and rotates subject areas. Preparing for 
the MEE, NCBE, https://www.ncbex.org/exams/mee/preparing/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2020). 
 144. The MPT is an exam simulating the application of law, where students are 
given a case file and must perform practical research and writing assignments. Preparing for 
the MPT, NCBE, https://www.ncbex.org/exams/mpt/preparing/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2020). 
 145.  See NCBE, 2020 MEE SUBJECT MATTER OUTLINE 7–8 (2019), 
https://www.ncbex.org/pdfviewer/?file=%2Fdmsdocument%2F227 [hereinafter NCBE, 
2020 MEE SUBJECT MATTER OUTLINE]. 
 146. Id. Specifically, in addition to the topics examined in the MBE, the MEE also 
covers business law, commercial law, conflicts of law, estates and probate law, and family 
law. Id. Because the MEE rotates subject areas, some years, family law is not included on the 
UBE at all. Id. For example, neither the February nor the July 2015 MEE exams included 
family law questions. See February 2015 MEE Sample Questions, NCBE, 
https://www.ble.mn.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Representative-Good-Answers-Feb-
2015.pdf; July 2015 MEE Sample Questions, NCBE, https://www.ble.mn.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/Representative-Good-Answers-July-2015.pdf. 
 147. NCBE, 2020 MEE SUBJECT MATTER OUTLINE, supra note 145, at 7–8. 
 148. See Family Law on the Multistate Essay Exam: Highly Tested Topics and Tips, 
J.D. ADVISING, https://www.jdadvising.com/family-law-on-the-multistate-essay-exam-
highly-tested-topics-and-tips/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2019) (identifying child custody and 
support, property division, and spousal support as the most frequently tested subjects); Dawne 
Ducarpe, Bar Review: Family Law, MAGOOSH, (July 12, 2017), https://magoosh.com/bar-
exam/bar-review-family-law/ (identifying economic issues, marital termination, and matters 
relating to children as the most frequently tested subjects). 
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general subject areas of marriage, divorce, child custody, and child support. 
Specifically, 15 of the 25 MEE exams administered in this period tested family 
law.149 The most commonly tested topics were child custody (tested 9 times),150 
marital property (tested 8 times),151 child support (tested 5 times),152 spousal support 
(tested 4 times),153 child custody jurisdiction (tested 4 times),154 premarital 
agreements (tested 4 times),155 and family privacy (tested 3 times).156 Occasionally, 
common law marriage,157 modification of settlement agreements,158 adoption,159 
 
 149. The NCBE posts five years of previously administered MEE questions on its 
website, adding new questions and deleting older questions on a rolling basis. See Preparing 
for the MEE, supra note 143 (posting questions from July 2015 to February 2015). This 
analysis is based on the MEE exams presently posted, see id., as well as earlier MEE exams 
previously posted by the NCBE and subsequent MEE exams posted on various state bar 
websites. All exams discussed in this analysis are on file with the author. 
 150. July 2008 MEE Questions and Analyses, NCBE (on file with author) 
[hereinafter July 2008 MEE]; February 2009 MEE Questions and Analyses, NCBE (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Feb. 2009 MEE]; July 2009 MEE Questions and Analyses, NCBE 
(on file with author) [hereinafter July 2009 MEE]; July 2011 MEE Questions and Analyses, 
NCBE (on file with author) [hereinafter July 2011 MEE]; July 2012 MEE Questions and 
Analyses, NCBE (on file with author) [hereinafter July 2012 MEE]; July 2013 MEE Questions 
and Analyses, NCBE (on file with author) [hereinafter July 2013 MEE]; February 2017 MEE 
& MPT Questions, N.Y. ST. BAR EXAM (containing NCBE February 2017 MEE Questions) 
(on file with author) [hereinafter Feb. 2017 MEE]; February 2018 MEE & MPT Questions, 
N.Y. ST. BAR EXAM (containing NCBE February 2018 MEE Questions) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Feb. 2018 MEE]; July 2019 MEE & MPT Questions, N.Y. ST. BAR EXAM 
(containing NCBE July 2019 MEE Questions) (on file with author) [hereinafter July 2019 
MEE]. 
 151. July 2008 MEE, supra note 150; February 2010 MEE Questions and Analyses, 
NCBE (on file with author) [hereinafter Feb. 2010 MEE]; July 2010 MEE Questions and 
Analyses, NCBE (on file with author) [hereinafter July 2010 MEE]; February 2011 MEE 
Questions and Analyses, NCBE (on file with author) [hereinafter Feb. 2011 MEE]; July 2014 
MEE Questions and Analyses, NCBE (on file with author) [hereinafter July 2014 MEE]; 
February 2016 MEE Questions & Best Answers, AR. BAR EXAM (containing NCBE February 
2016 MEE Questions) (on file with author) [hereinafter Feb. 2016 MEE]; Feb. 2017 MEE, 
supra note 150; Feb. 2018 MEE, supra note 150. 
 152. February 2008 MEE Questions and Analyses, NCBE (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Feb. 2008 MEE]; Feb. 2009 MEE, supra note 150; July 2009 MEE, supra note 
150; Feb. 2011 MEE, supra note 151; July 2013 MEE, supra note 150; July 2014 MEE, supra 
note 151. 
 153. See Feb. 2010 MEE, supra note 151; July 2010 MEE, supra note 151; Feb. 
2011 MEE, supra note 151; July 2019 MEE, supra note 150. 
 154. July 2009 MEE, supra note 150; July 2011 MEE, supra note 150; July 2012 
MEE, supra note 150; July 2019 MEE, supra note 150. 
 155. July 2008 MEE, supra note 150; July 2010 MEE, supra note 151; Feb. 2016 
MEE, supra note 151; Feb. 2018 MEE, supra note 150. 
 156. July 2012 MEE, supra note 150; July 2013 MEE, supra note 150; July 2019 
MEE, supra note 150. 
 157. July 2011 MEE, supra note 150; Feb. 2017 MEE, supra note 150. 
 158. Feb. 2010 MEE, supra note 151; Feb. 2011 MEE, supra note 151. 
 159. Feb. 2008 MEE, supra note 152; July 2011 MEE, supra note 150. 
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divorce jurisdiction,160  child welfare,161 and paternity162 have also been tested, but 
(except for common law marriage) not recently. Additionally, 12 states and the 
Virgin Islands add a local component to the UBE, typically in the form of a short, 
low-stakes, online course163 or an open-book exam.164 These courses and open-book 
exams include some local elements of family law.165 Like the MEE, they generally 
focus on marriage, divorce, and child custody. 
Sixteen states and Puerto Rico substitute or supplement the MEE with a 
state-created essay question. Of these jurisdictions, most (11) test family law,166 a 
 
 160. July 2014 MEE, supra note 151. 
 161. July 2013 MEE, supra note 150. 
 162. Feb. 2011 MEE, supra note 151. 
 163.  Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Washington, and the Virgin 
Islands require bar applicants to review outlines on local laws and pass an open-book exam 
online. Maryland Law Component, STATE BD. L. EXAM’RS, 
https://www.courts.state.md.us/ble/mdlawcomponent (last visited Feb. 27, 2020); The 
Massachusetts Law Component (MLC), BD. BAR EXAM’RS, https://www.mass.gov/how-
to/the-massachusetts-law-component-mlc (last visited Feb. 27, 2020); Missouri Educational 
Component, MO. BD. L. EXAM’RS, https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=325 (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2020); NYLC & NYLE Course Materials & Sample Questions, N.Y. STATE BD. L. 
EXAM’RS, https://www.nybarexam.org/Content/CourseMaterials.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 
2020); Washington Law Component Test, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.wsba.org/for-legal-professionals/join-the-legal-profession-in-wa/washington-
law-component (last visited Feb. 27, 2020); Virgin Islands Law Component (VILC), JUD. 
BRANCH U.S. V.I., https://www.vicourts.org/professional_regulation/bar_admission/virgin_
islands_law_component (last visited Feb. 27, 2020). 
 164. Specifically, Alabama, Arizona, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, and Tennessee all require bar applicants to complete a short course on state 
laws, including state-specific family law. See Frequently Asked Questions, ALA. ST. BAR 
ADMISSIONS OFF., https://admissions.alabar.org/faq (last visited Feb. 27, 2020); Arizona Law 
Course Online Registration, ARIZ. JUD. BRANCH, 
https://www.azcourts.gov/educationservices/Committees/JCA/Online-Registration (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2020); Admissions Information, ST. BAR MONT., 
https://www.montanabar.org/page/AdmissionInfo (last visited Feb. 27, 2020); Application by 
Bar Exam, N.M. BD. BAR EXAM’RS, http://www.nmexam.org/bar-exam/take-the-bar-
exam/process-forms-deadlines/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2020); Course Instructions, BD. L. 
EXAM’RS ST. N.C., https://www.ncble.org/nc-state-specific-component-course-instructions 
(last visited Sept. 19, 2019); S.C. CT. R. 402(c)(8), 
https://www.sccourts.org/courtReg/displayRule.cfm?ruleID=402.0&subRuleID=&ruleType
=APP (requiring successful completion of a course on South Carolina law); TENN. BD. L. 
EXAM’RS, https://www.tnble.org/?page_id=57 (last visited Feb. 27, 2020). 
 165. See, e.g., Maryland Law Component Subject Matter Outlines, MD. L. 
COMPONENT SUB-COMMITTEE, https://www.mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/ble/pdfs/
mlcoutlineube.pdf (last visited Feb. 28. 2020) (including topics of marriage, divorce, 
annulments, custody, child support, use and possession, division of property, alimony, and 
adoption); The Massachusetts Law Component (MLC), supra note 164 (including domestic 
relations as topic on test); Arizona Law Course Online Registration, supra note 164 (online 
course includes module on family law). 
 166. Specifically, California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Virginia give an independent, state-created essay 
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few extensively.167 These non-UBE states test primarily on the same topics as the 
UBE. For example, recent state-created essay exams have most commonly tested 
 
exam that includes family law; Wisconsin uses a combination of locally drafted and MEE 
essay questions. See Scope of the California Bar Exam, ST. BAR CAL., 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Admissions/Examinations/California-Bar-Examination/California
-Bar-Examination-Scope (last visited Oct. 15, 2020) (indicating that community property, 
i.e., the economic aspects of the marital relationship, is tested on the bar); Exam Information, 
Test Specifications, Study Guide, and Virtual Tour, FL. BD. BAR EXAM’RS (Aug. 28, 2020), 
https://www.floridabarexam.org/web/website.nsf/52286AE9AD5D845185257C07005C3FE
1/125BA5AFD5EB7D2385257C0B0067E748; SUP. CT. OF GA., RULES GOVERNING 
ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW 10 (2018), https://www.gabaradmissions.org/rules-
governing-admission; Overview of the Indiana Bar Exam, IND. JUD. BRANCH, 
https://www.in.gov/judiciary/ace/2529.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2019); The Bar Exam, LA. 
SUP. CT. COMM. ON BAR ADMISSIONS, https://www.lascba.org/BarExam
/Default.aspx?tab=subjects (last visited Sept. 28, 2019); MICH. BD. L. EXAM’RS, FULL LIST OF 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 6 (Feb. 5, 2020), 
https://courts.michigan.gov/Courts/MichiganSupremeCourt/BLE/Documents/BLE-
FAQs.pdf; Bar Exam Subjects and Test Format, ST. BAR NEV., https://www.nvbar.org/for-
lawyers/admissions/bar-exam/exam-subjects-and-test-format/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2019); 
Frequently Asked Questions, OKLA. BD. BAR EXAM’RS, 
http://www.okbbe.com/FAQ/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2020); Bar Exam Tests and 
Topics Tested, PA. BD. L. EXAM’RS, http://www.pabarexam.org/bar_exam_information/
testsubjects.htm (Oct. 9, 2020); VA. BD. BAR EXAM’RS, RULES 1, 
https://barexam.virginia.gov/pdf/VBBERules.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2020); WIS. BD. BAR 
EXAM’RS, S. CT. WISC., INFORMATION AND FILING INSTRUCTIONS—ELECTRONIC APPLICATION 
4 (2020). Two of the 11 jurisdictions, Delaware and Puerto Rico, do not include family law 
on their state-created essay exams and, as a result, currently do not test on family law at all. 
DEL. BD. OF EXAM’RS, RULES OF THE BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE  
6, https://courts.delaware.gov/forms/download.aspx?id=28408 (last visited Feb. 27, 2020);  
Requirements for Bar Admission, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR DIST. OF P.R., 
https://www.prd.uscourts.gov/requirements-bar-admission (last visited Oct. 15, 2020). 
 167. For example, Indiana and Michigan include family law on every bar exam. See 
Indiana Essay Exam Feb. 2019, IND. BD. L. EXAM’RS, https://myble.courts.in.gov/feb2019 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2019) (testing on child custody, adoption, and termination of parental 
rights); Indiana Essay Exam July 2019, IND. BD. L. EXAM’RS, 
https://myble.courts.in.gov/july2019 (last visited Sept. 28, 2019) (testing on child support, 
divorce grounds, and premarital agreements); Indiana Essay Exam July 2018, IND. BD. L. 
EXAM’RS, https://myble.courts.in.gov/july-2018 (last visited Sept. 28, 2019) (testing on child 
support and division of property); Indiana Essay Exam Feb. 2018, IND. BD. L. EXAM’RS, 
https://myble.courts.in.gov/feb2018 (last visited Sept. 28, 2019) (testing on marriage of 
minors, child custody, and establishment of paternity); February 2019 Michigan Bar 
Examination Bar Examiners’ Analyses, MICH. BD. L. EXAM’RS, 
https://courts.michigan.gov/Courts/MichiganSupremeCourt/BLE/Documents/February_201
9_Examiners_Anaylses.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2019) (testing on modification of spousal 
support agreements); July 2018 Michigan Bar Examination Bar Examiners’ Analyses, MICH. 
BD. L. EXAM’RS, https://courts.michigan.gov/Courts/MichiganSupremeCourt/BLE/
Documents/past-exams/July2018_ExaminersAnalyses.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2019) 
(testing on child support); February 2018 Michigan Bar Examination Bar Examiners’ 
Analyses, MICH. BD. L. EXAM’RS, https://courts.michigan.gov/Courts/MichiganSupreme
Court/BLE/Documents/past-exams/Feb_2018_Examiners_Analyses.pdf (last visited Sept. 
29, 2019) (testing division of marital property). 
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divorce, including division of marital property168 and spousal support;169 the 
enforceability of divorce settlement agreements;170 and child custody171 and child 
support.172 Some states also occasionally include questions on premarital 
agreements,173 parental rights,174 and adoption.175 
In sum, family law is tested on the bar across the United States. Yet for 
most bar applicants, knowledge of just a few frequently tested topics will be 
necessary. This state of affairs significantly influences law school curricula. Because 
the bar exam tests state-based family law doctrine, not tax, benefits programs, 
alternative dispute resolution, immigration, ERISA,176 COBRA, and other areas that 
family lawyers often must address in the context of even the most basic divorce, this 
likely reinforces law professors’ tendency to stay away from these crucial materials, 
“despite [their] enormous impact on client well-being.”177 The bar also likely 
influences the topics covered in family law casebooks. These findings suggest that 
those concerned with the mismatch between the basic family law course in law 
 
 168. See, e.g., July 2016 Kentucky Essay Questions, KY. OFF. BAR ADMISSIONS, 
https://kyoba.org/files/files/S16%20Questions%20Website%20Ready.pdf (last visited Oct. 
16, 2020); February 2018 Michigan Bar Examination Bar Examiners’ Analyses, MICH. BD. 
L. EXAM’RS, https://courts.michigan.gov/Courts/MichiganSupremeCourt/BLE/Documents/
past-exams/Feb_2018_Examiners_Analyses.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2020). 
 169. See, e.g., February 2015 Bar Examination Sample Answers, GA. OFF. BAR 
ADMISSIONS, https://www.gabaradmissions.org/feb15a (last visited Sept. 28, 2019); February 
2019 Michigan Bar Examination Bar Examiners’ Analyses, MICH. BD. L. EXAM’RS, 
https://courts.michigan.gov/Courts/MichiganSupremeCourt/BLE/Documents/February_201
9_Examiners_Anaylses.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2019). 
 170. July 2016 Kentucky Essay Questions, supra note 168. 
 171. See, e.g., February 2018 Bar Examination Sample Answers, GA. OFF. BAR 
ADMISSIONS, https://www.gabaradmissions.org/feb18a (last visited Sept. 28, 2019); Indiana 
Essay Exam Feb. 2018, IND. BD. L. EXAM’RS, https://myble.courts.in.gov/feb2018 (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2019); Indiana Essay Exam Feb. 2019, IND. BD. L. EXAM’RS, 
https://myble.courts.in.gov/feb2019 (last visited Sept. 28, 2019); February 2015 Bar 
Examination Sample Answers, GA. OFF. BAR ADMISSIONS, 
https://www.gabaradmissions.org/feb15a (last visited Sept. 28, 2019). 
 172. FLA. BD. BAR EXAM’RS, FLORIDA BAR EXAMINATION STUDY GUIDE AND 
SELECTED ANSWERS 11–12 (Aug. 2019); Indiana Essay Exam July 2018, IND. BD. L. 
EXAM’RS, https://myble.courts.in.gov/july-2018 (last visited Sept. 28, 2019); Indiana Essay 
Exam July 2019, IND. BD. L. EXAM’RS, https://myble.courts.in.gov/july2019 (last visited Sept. 
28, 2019); July 2018 Michigan Bar Examination Bar Examiners’ Analyses, MICH. BD. L. 
EXAM’RS, https://courts.michigan.gov/Courts/MichiganSupremeCourt/BLE/Documents/
past-exams/July2018_ExaminersAnalyses.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2019). 
 173. Indiana Essay Exam July 2019, IND. BD. L. EXAM’RS, 
https://myble.courts.in.gov/july2019 (last visited Sept. 28, 2019). 
 174. FLA. BD. BAR EXAM’RS, FLORIDA BAR EXAMINATION STUDY GUIDE AND 
SELECTED ANSWERS 5–6 (Aug. 2018), https://www.floridabarexam.org/__
85257bfe0055eb2c.nsf/52286ae9ad5d845185257c07005c3fe1/466efda0a98891ad852582dc
006bd64f. 
 175. Id. 
 176. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 
(2018) (serving as the primary source of U.S. pension law). 
 177. See O’Connell & DiFonzo, supra note 123, at 538 (discussing negative 
consequences of the bar exam on law school family law courses and curricula). 
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school and the practice of family law may need to look beyond law schools―and 
especially to the bar exam―in their efforts to design a family law curriculum for the 
21st century.178 
B. Implications for the Ideology of the Family 
A surprisingly large number of law students enter law schools with the idea 
that being a lawyer means something more than just having a career.179 There is the 
idea of “doing justice,” for example, by representing disadvantaged people or 
helping to change the law for the better; helping their own families and communities; 
or working on the hardest and most important problems in our society. And although 
most students who take family law do not enroll in the course because they want to 
practice family law, they understand that many areas of legal practice will require 
them to have some knowledge of the field. There are also motives for taking family 
law unrelated to career. Studying the law of love, sex, and money is for many 
students more interesting than the relationships and institutions considered in other 
courses. That is, the human side of family law is a respite from the dry nature of the 
content in many courses. Law students are also motivated by the desire to help their 
own families and communities. By learning a little family law, they think, perhaps 
 
 178. Toward that end, the NCBE appointed a Testing Task Force in 2018 that is 
undertaking a three-year review by consultants to ensure the UBE is effectively ensuring 
competence of new lawyers. NCBE, YEAR IN REVIEW 5 (2018), 
http://www.ncbex.org/pdfviewer/?file=%2Fdmsdocument%2F231. Last year, the Testing 
Task Force conducted listening sessions with stakeholders and found the major concerns to 
be that the current UBE goes more in depth than necessary in some subject areas and that the 
exam insufficiently tests skills. NCBE, YOUR VOICE: STAKEHOLDER THOUGHTS ABOUT THE 
BAR EXAM 3 (2019), https://www.testingtaskforce.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/FINAL-
Listening-Session-Executive-Summary-with-Appendices-1.pdf. The Testing Task Force is 
currently administering a nationwide practice analysis to assess how currently tested subjects 
and skills align with practice. Id. Curricular reformers and casebook authors might consider 
becoming involved in this review process and soliciting the endorsement of bar examiners in 
their efforts. Id. at 5. 
 179. Numerous studies have found that a significant population of law students are 
attracted to law by a desire to help others, improve society, and redress injustice; additionally, 
these studies explore the aspects of legal education and socialization into the legal profession 
that dampen these aspirations. See ROBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS: VISIONS OF 
LAW AT HARVARD AND BEYOND 52 (1992) (study of legal education examining how training 
to “think like a lawyer” pulls law students away from altruistic, public-interest goals by 
shifting their thinking from a “justice-oriented consciousness” to a “game-oriented 
consciousness”); LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 27–28, 49–71 (1997) (indicting traditional law school teaching for 
creating a chilly climate that is differentially discouraging to women); ELIZABETH MERTZ, 
THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” 11, 226 n.16 (2007) 
(suggesting that law students’ drift away from public-interest ambitions may partially result 
from legal training and epistemology); John Bliss, From Idealists to Hired Guns? An 
Empirical Analysis of “Public Interest Drift” in Law School, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1973, 
1976–77 (2018) (study finding that some students have a strong inclination toward public-
interest jobs upon entering law schools and that the experience of the 2L hiring process is an 
important shaper of public-interest “drift”); Kennedy, supra note 68, at 591 (describing law 
school as “ideological training for willing service in the hierarchies of the corporate welfare 
state”). 
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they will be able to help their friends, families, and communities when they are 
called upon to provide informal legal advice, even if they do not intend to practice 
family law when they graduate. And so family law is a place in the law school 
curriculum where students can feel less alienated and more empowered to do good, 
especially as they begin in their second year of law school to face the ideological 
compromises and realities of professional life as a lawyer. Finally, for many 
students, taking family law is part of a personal journey. While only some law 
students have been involved in litigation, business partnerships, or the criminal 
justice system, everyone has a family. 
And, indeed, law students arrive in their family law classes with a 
surprising variety of relevant experiences. Most obviously, given the prevalence of 
divorce,180 a significant portion of law students come from families where their 
parents were divorced, or they themselves have been divorced. These students may 
have been raised in a single-parent household or with a stepparent present, or they 
are themselves (or have been) single parents or stepparents. There are students raised 
by never-married parents and students who spent parts of their childhoods in the 
care of grandparents. There are adopted students and students who have given up a 
child for adoption. In my many years of teaching family law, I have also had as 
students a polygamous wife, a student raised on a commune, and students who 
practice polyamory. Law students come to family law with negative experiences of 
sex and family, including incest, rape, abuse, neglect, and time spent in foster care. 
Law students have been victims of domestic violence or perpetrators of domestic 
violence or were raised by parents who were victims or perpetrators. Many gay law 
students were bullied as children, forced into conversion therapy, or rejected by their 
families. Transgender or transitioning law students have had to renegotiate their 
intimate and family relationships and also may have been rejected by family and 
friends. Many women law students have had abortions, a topic that is relevant in 
many family law cases, even if the cases do not directly address abortion. In other 
words, students who take family law typically come to the subject with a wide 
variety of motivations and experiences of family, sex, sexuality, and intimacy. 
The content of a typical basic introductory family law class, to the extent 
that casebooks are an indication of what a typical course covers, erases many of 
these family forms and experiences. The casebooks are overwhelmingly focused on 
marriage and divorce and, hence, on the legal problems of middle-class, 
heterosexual, white families.181 In an effort to present a seemingly more liberal 
stance on the field, casebooks sometimes begin with a chapter on “family privacy,” 
 
 180. In 2018, of every 1,000 married persons, 7.7 divorced. See U.S. Marriage and 
Divorce Rates by State, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jan. 15, 2020), 
https://www.census.gov/library/visualizations/interactive/marriage-divorce-rates-by-
state.html. 
 181. In the United States, there are distinctive socioeconomic and racial patterns 
around marriage; marriage rates are substantially higher among college-educated white 
people and lower among Americans with a high-school diploma or less, African Americans, 
and other people of color. See PEW RES. CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW 
FAMILIES 2 (2010), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2010/
11/pew-social-trends-2010-families.pdf.  
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which examines the limits of state interference in the family.182 Of course, students 
learn from these materials the small measure of constitutional protection afforded 
families and their members. But soon even the patina of this revelation wears off, as 
students learn the limits of this privacy principle183 and absorb a conservative 
ideological lesson of family law about the unresponsive state. Through the privacy 
materials, students learn the state has limited responsibility for providing for the 
welfare of its members184 or protecting family members from violence and abuse.185 
Alternatively, in an effort to present a more expansive understanding of the 
definition of family, some casebooks begin with a chapter exploring the legal status 
of roommates,186 extended families,187 and other intimate and family associations in 
an effort to answer the question: “What is a family?” Including these materials 
usually backfires, however, as students know these cases are the exception meant to 
prove the rule (i.e., lip service paid to nonmarital families) given that more than half 
of their casebooks are dedicated to the law of marriage and divorce. What really 
matters, they quickly learn, is the “real” family law, i.e., the family law that they 
need to know for the bar, which is primarily the law of marriage, divorce, child 
custody, and support. 
Before arriving at the topic of divorce and its consequences (the main act), 
most casebooks (and thus classes) address the substantive requirements of entering 
 
 182. In chronological order, cases covered in this unit may include Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (establishing the fundamental right to make child-rearing 
decisions free from unwarranted governmental intrusion); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510 (1925) (striking down a state statute requiring all children to attend public school and 
expanding due process clause protections of parents’ civil liberties); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (establishing a right to 
use contraception because there is a right “to be free from unwarranted governmental 
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or 
beget a child”); and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing a constitutional right to 
have an abortion without excessive government intrusion). 
 183. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874, 900–01 
(1992) (establishing the “undue burden” test, which permits more restrictions on abortion, 
including waiting periods and “informed consent” laws that require health care providers to 
inform women of the risks of abortion, the gestational age of the fetus, and abortion 
alternatives such as adoption); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007) (upholding the 
Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003, which banned intact dilation and extraction, a medically 
necessary form of late-term abortion). 
 184. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326–27 (1980) (holding that states 
participating in Medicaid are not required to fund medically necessary abortions for which 
federal funding is unavailable under the federal Hyde Amendment of 1976, which restricted 
the use of federal funds for abortion). 
 185. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding that parts of the 
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 were unconstitutional, because they exceeded the 
powers granted to Congress under the Commerce Clause and the Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005) (holding that a 
town and its police department could not be sued for their failure to enforce a domestic 
violence restraining order and consequent murder of a woman’s three children by her 
estranged husband, because, inter alia, a restraining order does constitute a property interest 
for the purposes of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 186. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2 (1974). 
 187. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 496 (1977). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3739733
2020] FAMILY LAW BY THE NUMBERS 945 
marriage, including marriage restrictions declared unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court.188 And many white students are often surprised and interested to learn that 
slaves could not marry and that slave children were routinely separated from parents 
and sold in slavery or that there was a time in the United States when interracial 
marriages were banned.189 They appreciate this bit of legal history, because it 
explains the significance of canonical Supreme Court decisions, and they know, at 
some level, the best lawyers are not merely technocrats who manipulate rules. But 
then anxiety arises in many students as they ask: why are we learning all this history? 
Is it going to be on the bar?190 And then students move from a mixture of curiosity 
and bar anxiety to discomfort as the casebook and course progress to the topic of 
same-sex marriage, for if a student is gay, they may not want to be out in class (or, 
understandably, to speak for all gay people). Conversely, if a student is homophobic, 
they may not want to reveal their views and possibly embarrass themselves or offend 
a classmate. And the same-sex marriage cases, ironically, sustain rather than reduce 
cynicism about family law and its possibilities for supporting diverse, intimate 
forms, because students learn from the marriage equality cases that marriage is 
sacred, a religion onto itself, a spiritual experience, indeed fundamental to all of 
society, including ordering social relations, distributing benefits, raising healthy 
children, and conferring dignity.191 This intellectual experience leads to a gradual 
revelation that family law is more in the business of sustaining traditional family 
forms than supporting new ones. 
Somewhere in the course, perhaps either before marriage and divorce or as 
an interlude, there will be a concise unit on nonmarital families, maybe one or two 
classes addressing the enforceability of economic agreements between nonmarital 
intimate partners.192 Or perhaps the professor will opt for more extensive study of 
nonmarital families and also include the topic of nonmarital families and third 
 
 188. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 
U.S. 374, 384 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 189. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 2. 
 190. The answer: probably not, at least on the family law portion of the bar exam. 
No UBE family law question has tested constitutional limits on marriage in the past decade. 
See supra notes 138–75 and accompanying text (discussing UBE coverage). 
 191. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 666 (2015) (“The nature of marriage 
is that, through its enduring bond, two persons together can find other freedoms, such as 
expression, intimacy, and spirituality.”); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 772 (2013) 
(“[Marriage allows] children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family 
and its concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives.”); Goodridge 
v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955 (Mass. 2003) (“Because it fulfils yearnings for 
security, safe haven, and connection that express our common humanity, civil marriage is an 
esteemed institution, and the decision whether and whom to marry is among life’s momentous 
acts of self-definition.”); see also Halley II, supra note 21, at 287. 
 192. Casebooks typically address this topic via Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 
122–23 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) (holding that nonmarital partners may assert contractual and 
equitable claims against each other and thereby have legal means to enforce their economic 
agreements at the end of their relationship). 
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parties.193 This will have complex effects; some students will react with appreciation 
and others will wonder why the professor is spending time on ancillary topics not 
generally tested on the bar. Ultimately ambivalence sets in even among the more left 
leaning students. And what lessons do family law casebooks teach students about 
nonmarriage? First, that nonmarital families do not exist, because casebooks give 
very little attention to the particular legal problems of unmarried persons, typically 
only one chapter, if at all.194 Second, students learn that, to the extent such families 
exist, the law is inconsistent in its recognition and protection of nonmarital partners. 
Specifically, as the leading cases on this topic instruct, although many states 
recognize agreements concerning nonmarried partners’ economic interests and 
possibly also equitable claims and remedies upon dissolution of their relationships, 
the availability of these claims is often an empty promise. In fact, the contract rights 
of nonmarried intimate partners are inferior to those of everyday people who are not 
in a sexual relationship. Third, students learn they will unlikely ever live in a state 
recognizing common law marriage, as only eight states recognize this doctrine.195 
Never mind that 59% of adults in the United States have lived with an unmarried 
partner.196 Fourth, students learn that the best bet for the Michelle Marvins of the 
world,197 if they want to ensure that their economic interests are protected, is to get 
 
 193. See, e.g., Graves v. Estabrook, 818 A.2d 1255, 1261–62 (N.H. 2003) 
(addressing the availability of tort damages for unmarried cohabitants who witness the 
negligent injury of their partner); N.D. Fair Hous. Council v. Peterson, 625 N.W.2d 551, 553 
(N.D. 2001) (addressing protection from housing discrimination on the basis of marital 
status); Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1099 (11th Cir. 1997) (addressing constitutionally 
based employment discrimination protections for LGBT employees on the basis of their 
intimate relationships with partners of the same-sex); In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 
N.W.2d 790, 792 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (addressing the ability of a lesbian partner to petition 
for guardianship of her brain-injured intimate partner). 
 194. In the last decade (from 2010 to 2019), 5.7% of the content of the casebooks 
in this study addressed the legal rights and obligations of nonmarital families, defined as 
common law marriage, cohabitation, contract rights, and rights vis a vis third parties. See 
supra Figure 7. 
 195. Common Law Marriage by State, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Mar. 11, 
2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/common-law-marriage.aspx (listing 
Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, New Hampshire, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah as 
states recognizing common law marriage). 
 196. Juliana Menasce Horowitz et al., Marriage and Cohabitation in the U.S., PEW 
RES. CTR. (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2019/11/06/marriage-and-
cohabitation-in-the-u-s/. 
 197. Michelle Marvin was the plaintiff in Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 
1976), who lived with actor Lee Marvin for approximately six years. Id. at 110. After their 
breakup, she sued him, claiming he promised to support her for the rest of her life, as she had 
given up her own successful career as an entertainer and singer to support his career as an 
actor. Id. at 110–11. The California Supreme Court ruled that she could bring both an express 
and implied contract claim to assert the alleged economic agreement. Id. at 122. Moreover, it 
reasoned in dicta that she could assert equitable claims such as quantum meruit for the 
reasonable value of household services or seek equitable remedies such as constructive or 
resulting trust. Id. at 122–23. On remand, the trial court found neither an express nor an 
implied contract based on the parties’ conduct. See Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 558 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1981). Nonetheless, the trial judge awarded Michelle Marvin $104,000 in 
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married. Of course, these do not have to be the lessons of the typical unit on 
nonmarital partners in family law. A critical stance on the law of nonmarital 
cohabitation has become the subject of an expanding body of legal scholarship.198 
Yet one would not know of this critical energy after picking up a typical family law 
casebook. These textbooks contain a dearth of nonmarriage cases,199 as well as a 
general lack of critical content on the law of nonmarriage. This sends the message 
to students that there is no purchase for unconventional thinking about the family in 
the typical family law course. 
And then, after four to five weeks, students finally get to the topic they 
thought they enrolled in family law to learn—divorce. They know this is the main 
family law topic (other than child custody) tested on the bar, so they really start to 
perk up. But they soon learn that the main problem presented in their casebooks is 
the economic dislocation of the 1970s’ and 1980s’ middle-class housewife and that 
 
“rehabilitative alimony” based on the California Supreme Court’s contemplation of broad 
equitable remedies, the plaintiff’s resort to unemployment benefits for support, and Lee 
Marvin’s net worth at separation exceeding $1 million. Id. at 559. The trial judge arrived at 
the amount by calculating plaintiff’s highest salary as a singer for two years prior to the 
couple’s cohabitation. Id. at 557. The appellate court reversed, reasoning that the trial court 
had merely established plaintiff’s need and defendant’s ability to pay. Id. at 559. The court 
elaborated: 
A court of equity admittedly has broad powers, but it may not create totally 
new substantive rights under the guise of doing equity. . . . [I]n view of 
the already-mentioned findings of no damage (but benefit instead), no 
unjust enrichment and no wrongful act on the part of defendant with 
respect to either the relationship or its termination, it is clear that no basis 
whatsoever, either in equity or in law, exists for the challenged 
rehabilitative award. 
Id. 
 198. See, e.g., Erez Aloni, Deprivative Recognition, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1276 passim 
(2014) (revealing how state recognition of nonmarital cohabiting relationships confers all of 
the burdens but none of the benefits); Albertina Antognini, Against Nonmarital 
Exceptionalism, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1891 passim (2018) (demonstrating how courts 
impose gendered marital norms on unmarried partners); Clare Huntington, Postmarital 
Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167 passim (2015) 
(identifying the disjuncture between family life in nonmarital families and family law and 
offering ways that family law can change to facilitate effective co-parenting in nonmarital 
families). For earlier considerations, see CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, 
LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 173–220 (2010) (explaining how the United States is out of step 
with other developed nations with respect to protections for cohabitants); FINEMAN, supra 
note 13, at 145–76 (discussing the law’s undue attention to the adult sexual relationship at the 
expense of legal recognition and support of the parent/child relationship); POLIKOFF, supra 
note 14, at 126–31 (arguing that marriage should not bestow special legal privileges upon 
couples, because people live in a variety of household configurations, including nonmarried 
cohabitation, single-parent households, extended (biological) family units, and myriad 
others); Grace Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28 
UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1166 (1981) (recommending, for purposes of support and property 
division, treating nonmarried cohabitants similarly to married persons if they have remained 
together for two years or if a child is born to the parties). 
 199. See supra Figure 7 (showing that that 5.7% of the family law casebook content 
in the past decade addresses cohabitation). 
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the primary purpose of family law is to protect vulnerable women and children from 
the harms of marriage and marital dissolution,200 no matter that marriage is on the 
decline,201 that black families are less likely than white families to participate in 
marriage,202 that today most women engage in paid employment,203 and that same-
sex marriage and men’s increased caregiving all complicate the casebooks’ implicit 
lessons on the harms of the law’s nonrecognition of sex-roles in marriage. 
The lack of attention in family law casebooks to the differential economic 
positions between black and white women (and wealthy and low-income women) 
vis-à-vis their intimate partners is particularly glaring. Contrary to the theme of 
wives’ special vulnerability in divorce that is heavily present in most family law 
casebooks, demographic data show that almost 70% of women in the bottom quintile 
of earners have the same or higher income than their spouses.204 Furthermore, the 
wage gap between African-American women and African-American men is less 
than the gap between white women and white men.205 African-American men 
experience significantly higher rates of unemployment than African-American 
women, and the unemployment gap between African-American women and 
 
 200. See Halley II, supra note 21, at 290 (“Feminist identity politics is obsessed 
with the homemaker wife’s distributional fate at the time of divorce, despite the fact that 
women with no role in the paid workforce are a steeply declining demographic.”). 
 201. See PEW RES. CTR., supra note 181, at i (“[A]bout half (52%) of all adults in 
this country were married in 2008; back in 1960, seven-in-ten (72%) were.”). 
 202. Id. at 9 (“In 1960, 61% of black adults were married. By 2008, that share had 
dropped to 32%.”). 
 203. U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., DEP’T OF LAB., BLS REP. NO. 1077, WOMEN IN 
THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 1, 3 (2018), https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/womens-
databook/2018/pdf/home.pdf (reporting that in 2017, 57% of all women participated in the 
labor force, and of these women, 62% worked full -time and year round); A.W. Geiger & 
Kim Parker, For Women’s History Month, A Look at Gender Gains—and Gaps—in the U.S., 
PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 15, 2018), http://pewrsr.ch/2HDZtxX (reporting that in 2018, 31% of 
women who are married to or cohabiting with a male partner contribute at least half of the 
couple’s total earnings, up from just 13% in 1980). Of course, despite these gains, women 
still remain less attached to the labor force than men. See generally Laura T. Kessler, The 
Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women’s Cultural Caregiving, and the 
Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371 (2001). 
However, the fact that women are less attached to the labor force than men does not alter the 
fact that family law casebooks underrecognize women’s economic autonomy, and most all 
but ignore the differential attachment to work of black and white women. See U.S. BUREAU 
OF LAB. STAT., DEP’T OF LAB., BLS REP. NO. 1076, LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS BY RACE 
AND ETHNICITY, 2017, at 3 (2018), https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/race-and-
ethnicity/2017/pdf/home.pdf (reporting that, among adult women age 20 and older, black 
women (62.5%) were more likely to participate in the labor force than Hispanic women 
(58.9%), Asian women (58.3%), and white women (57.6%)). 
 204. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Whither/Wither Alimony?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 925, 
949–50 (2015) (reviewing CYNTHIA LEE STARNES, THE MARRIAGE BUYOUT: THE TROUBLED 
TRAJECTORY OF U.S. ALIMONY LAW (2014)). 
 205. INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RES., THE GENDER WAGE GAP: 2018 EARNING 
DIFFERENCES BY RACE AND ETHNICITY tbl.1 (2019), https://iwpr.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/08/C478_Gender-Wage-Gap-in-2018.pdf (reporting that in 2017 and 
2018, African-American women averaged 89% of what African-American men made, 
compared to white women who averaged 81.5% of what white men made). 
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African-American men is significantly greater than the unemployment gap between 
white women and white men.206 Thus, there is less reason (than for white different-
sex couples) to assume economic disparity disadvantaging African-American 
women in African-American couples. The economic vulnerabilities that many 
family law casebooks are seeking to solve in the chapters on divorce are a white, 
middle-class woman’s problem. The experiences of poor women and women of 
color are simply left out (not to mention same-sex married partners). Worse, the 
implicit suggestion that economic remedies such as spousal support, child support, 
and protection of economic settlements from discharge in bankruptcy need to be 
shored up may be downright harmful to low-income women and women of color, 
who often earn comparably more than their partners and still do most of the unpaid 
family labor. 
What do law students learn from the glaring absence of low-income women 
and men and families of color in their family law casebooks? For students with these 
backgrounds and identities, the implicit message is that their experiences are not 
relevant. They come to expect that lawyers live in a world in which people like them 
are not represented or are misrepresented. In anthropological terms, this difficulty is 
the problem of “cultural invisibility and dominance,” that is, some viewpoints 
become invisible while others dominate, all the while, this process is usually hidden 
beneath the apparent neutrality of classroom content.207 More broadly, the approach 
(or nonapproach) to race, economic inequality, and the family genders and races the 
marital space. Furthermore, the disproportionate focus on marriage, particularly 
women’s supposedly unequal position in different-sex marriage, ratifies the idea that 
legal realms most relevant to low-income families and families of color, such as 
government benefits law, criminal law, and immigration law, are not family law. 
CONCLUSION 
The focus on marriage and divorce in family law casebooks has decreased 
since the 1960s, especially marriage. Child custody and child support have partially 
replaced these topics. Thus, we see a reordering of priorities in casebooks among 
family law’s traditionally core topics, with a shift toward topics concerning the 
parent/child relationship. Yet it cannot be said that the Law of Intimacy has arrived. 
Noncore family law topics (such as cohabitation, assisted reproduction, race and 
family law, and reproductive rights) constitute the minority of family law casebook 
coverage (about 40%), and there does not appear to be any disruption in the balance 
between core family law (marriage, divorce, child custody, and child support) and 
noncore family law topics (everything else) in the past 40 years. The outside 
boundaries of the discipline of family law appear to be quite stubborn. 
These findings confirm that family law casebooks “vastly lag behind social 
developments.”208 Family law casebooks emphasize marriage and divorce and the 
problems of middle-class, white families. They perpetuate the historical template 
separating family law from bodies of law that regulate families such as criminal law, 
 
 206. See Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. BUREAU 
LAB. STAT. (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat05.htm. 
 207. See MERTZ, supra note 179, at 5. 
 208. See Halley II, supra note 21, at 292. 
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immigration law, tax law, and poverty law. This mismatch perpetuates a set of 
problematic exclusions and ideologies of the family. If we are to adequately prepare 
our students for the practice of family law and accurately present social conditions 
in the classroom, then legal thinkers and family law teachers must reform the 
materials we use to teach family law. The time is ripe to remake the academic field 
of family law—to write a new story. 
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